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ARMY OPERATIONS IN CHINA

January 1944 - August 1945

PREPARED BY
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PREFACE

This monograph is one of a series prepared under instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN No. 126, 12 Oct 1945). The series covers not only the operations of the Japanese armed forces during World War II but also their operations in China and Manchuria which preceded the world conflict. The original studies were written by former officers of the Japanese Army and Navy under the supervision of the Historical Records Section of the First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureaus of the Japanese Government. The manuscripts were translated by the Military Intelligence Service Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command. Extensive editing was accomplished by the Japanese Research Division of the Office of the Military History Officer, Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Far East and Eighth United States Army (Rear).

The writers were handicapped in the preparation of the basic manuscript by the non-availability of many operational records which are normally employed as source material in this type of study. Many official orders, plans and unit journals were lost during field operations and bombing raids or were destroyed at the cessation of hostilities. A particular handicap has been the lack of strength reports. Most of the important orders and other information sources, however, have been reconstructed from memory and while not textually identical with the originals are believed to be accurate and reliable.

This monograph describes the planning and conduct of the "Ichi-Go" Operation which was undertaken to destroy enemy airfields in China from which it was feared the United States and Chinese Air Forces were preparing to launch bombing attacks against Japan. It also gives details of the plans and preparations to counter contemplated attacks by the United States and Russian forces against the Japanese forces in China after June 1945.

As the basic manuscript was written largely from memory it has been necessary for the Japanese Research Division to conduct extensive research in order to evaluate the information, to check both facts and dates and to add pertinent data. The History Section, Army War College, Japanese Self-Defense Force has, for the past year, been collecting documents and studying the situation during the China Incident. Just prior to the completion of this study, information obtained from that source brought to light a number of inaccuracies in the original manuscript, particularly in regard to the planning and

conduct of the Peiping-Hankou Operation. Large portions of this monograph were rewritten to effect the necessary corrections. In addition, as the manuscript was submitted with very inadequate maps, this office prepared the many maps required to illustrate the text. Spelling of place names in the text and on the maps is that used in AMS 5301.

The editor received valuable assistance in research and in the preparation of maps from Tadao Shudo, formerly a lieutenant colonel on the staff of the 11th Army in central China and later a member of the Army General Staff and Air Army General Staff.

Other monographs covering the operations of the Japanese armed forces in the China area are:

Mono No	<u>Title</u>	Period
7 0*	China Area Operations Record	Jul 37 - Nov 41
71*	Army Operations in China	Dec 41 - Dec 43
74*	Operations in the Kun-lun-kuan Area	Dec 39 - Feb 40
76	Air Operations in the China Area	Jul 37 - Aug 45
129*	China Area Operations Record: Command of China Expeditionary Army	Aug 43 - Aug 45
130*	China Area Operations Record: Sixth Area Army Operations	May 44 - Aug 45
166	China Incident Naval Air Operations	Jul 37 - Nov 37
178*	North China Area Operations Record	Jul 37 - May 41
179*	Central China Area Operations Record	1937 - 1941
180*	South China Area Operations Record	1937 - 1941

^{*}Indicates edit completed.

Tokyo, Japan 31 Aug 1956

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GENERAL REFERENCE MAP-CHAPTER 1



Chapter I

Ichi-Go Operation

Situation Prior to the Operation

By the fall of 1943 the ever-present threat of the enemy air force striking Japan from the interior of China, its constant harassing of water transportation and the destruction of lines of communication between Japan and the Southern Area made an operation against the interior of China vitally necessary. Imperial General Headquarters ordered plans to be drawn up for the capture of strategic points along the Hunan-Kwangsi, Canton-Hankou and southern Peiping-Hankou railways. The operation was to be known as the "Ichi-Go" Operation and its initial objectives were the capture of Kweilin and Liuchowhsien airfields; countermeasures against enemy activities in southern China; the securing of land communications to the Southern Army via French Indo-China and the overthrow of the Chungking Government. Toward the end of January 1944, Imperial General Headquarters approved this plan and ordered the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army to execute the "Ichi-Go" Operation.


Since early 1943, the United States had steadily increased its air force in China. By the beginning of 1944 there were more than 500 U.S. planes in this area, whereas, in spite of the organization of the 5th Air Army, the Japanese Air Force had less than half

this number of planes in China. Furthermore, with the war situation rapidly growing worse in the Pacific, the Japanese Air Force in China could not hope for any replenishment. Enemy planes not only interfered with Japanese ground operations, but also harassed the lines of communication and attacked the occupied areas.

Chinese ground strength had also developed considerably. It was estimated that in conducting the Peiping-Hankou Operation the North China Area Army would be faced by both the 1st and 5th War Sector Armies. These armies were deployed in strategic positions along the Peiping-Hankou railway as well as in the areas west of the railway. In addition, they had a mobile unit of considerable strength. During the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation in central and southern China, the Japanese 11th and 23d Armies would be faced by the 4th, 6th and 9th War Sector Armies, supported by the 3d and 5th War Sector Armies. In fact, it was estimated that during the "Ichi-Go" Operation, the Japanese forces would be faced by the majority of troops under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, supported by the United States Air Force.

After the outbreak of war in the Pacific, most of the welltrained and experienced Japanese divisions in China were transferred to the Southern Area. This left only newly organized forces, inferior in quality, to cope with the situation in China.

Disposition of the enemy forces in north and central China prior to the "Ichi-Go" Operation were as shown on Map 2.



The disposition of Japanese forces in China in January 1944

was:

Army		Area	Strength	
Mongolia Garrison Army		Mongo lia	26th Div, 3d Arm Div, 2d Ind Mixed Brig	
North China	lst Army	Shansi Province	37th Div, 62d Div, 69th Div, 3d Ind Mixed Brig	
Area Army	12th Army	Shantung Prov. 32d Div, 35th Div, 59th & Northeastern 5th Ind Mixed Brig, 7th Honan Province Mixed Brig, 4th Cav Brig		
Units under direct command of Area Army		Hopei Province & Northern Honan Province	63d Div, 110th Div, 1st Ind Mixed Brig, 8th Ind Mixed Brig, 9th Ind Mixed Brig	
11t	h Army	Wuchiang-Hankou Area	3d Div, 13th Div, 34th Div, 39th Div, 40th Div, 58th Div, 68th Div, 116th Div, 17th Ind Mixed Brig	
13th Army		Lower Area of Yangtze River	22d Div, 60th Div, 61st Div, 64th Div, 65th Div, 70th Div	
23d Army		South China Area	104th Div, 19th Ind Mixed Brig, 22d Ind Mixed Brig, 23d Ind Mixed Brig	
Total		24 divisions, 1 armored division, 11 independent mixed brigades and 1 cavalry briga		

^{1.} Originally the 116th Division was assigned to the 13th Army. In the fall of 1943 it was placed under the tactical command of the 11th Army. It then participated in the Changte Operation and remained in the Wuchang-Hankou area. (Monograph No. 71. Army Operations in China, Dec 1941 - Dec 1943.)

Operational Command

Imperial General Headquarters, aware that the United States Air Force was capable of bombing Japan with its B-29's from bases in Kweilin and Liuchowhsien, on 24 January issued the following order to the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army:

Imperial General Headquarters desires important enemy bases in southwestern China destroyed.

The China Expeditionary Army will seize the important areas along the Hunan-Kwangsi, Canton-Hankou and southern Peiping-Hankou railways.

Imperial General Headquarters also published an outline of the plans for the China Expeditionary Army and Southern Army's operations during the "Ichi-Go" Operation. At the same time, it emphasized that preparations for these operations would be undertaken with the utmost secrecy.

Outline of "Ichi-Go" Operation

Objective

Important areas along the Hunan-Kwangsi, Ganton-Hankou and southern Feiping-Hankou railways will be captured and maintained and vital enemy air bases will be destroyed, thus neutralizing enemy air activities.

Course of Operation

In late spring of 1944, the China Expeditionary Army will commence its operation from north China and from the Wuchang-Hankou area and, in summer, from the Wuchang-Hankou and Kwangtung areas.

The China Expeditionary Army will destroy the enemy, particularly those units under the direct command of the Central Government. It will capture and secure first the southern sector of the Peiping-Hankou railway south of the Huang Ho and then the strategic areas along the Hunan-Kwangsi and Canton-Hankou railways. If circumstances permit during subsequent operations, the Peiping-Hankou and Canton-Hankou railways will be repaired.

The Southern Army, in cooperation with the China Expeditionary Army, will conduct operations from Burma and Indo-China.

Conduct of the Operation

Peiping-Hankou Operation

The North China Area Army will begin its operation about April 1944. It will destroy the enemy, especially the main force of the 1st War Sector Army and capture and secure the areas south of the Huang Ho and along the southern Peiping-Hankou railway.

The period for this operation is estimated to be a month and a half.

The forces to be employed will be the 12th Army (composed mainly of four divisions) and part of the 5th Air Army.

Upon completion of this operation the necessary forces will be transferred by land to the Hunan-Kwangsi operational area by way of the Wuchang-Hankou sector.

The newly occupied area will be secured by approximately two divisions.

Hunan-Kwangsi Operation

The 11th Army will commence its operation from the Wuchang-Hankou area about June 1944, while the 23d Army will commence its operation from the Canton area about July or August.

These armies will destroy the main force of the 6th and 9th War Sector Armies. After the Kweilin and Liuchowhsien areas have been captured, both armies will mop up the remaining hostile troops in the areas along the Hunan-Kwangsi and the Canton-Hankou railways and will occupy and secure these areas.

The period for this operation is estimated to be approximately five months.

Depending upon the circumstances, air bases in the Suichuan and Nanhsiung areas may be destroyed.

About January or February 1945, the 23d Army will capture Nanning and its vicinity. It will also secure the road between Kweilin and Langson.

Prior to the 11th Army operation, the entire force of the 5th Air Army will annihilate the U.S.-China Air Force and attain air supremacy in order that it might cooperate directly with the ground operations whenever necessary.

The forces to be used during this operation are:

11th Army - seven or eight divisions
23d Army - two divisions
Units under direct
command of the China
Expeditionary Army - one or two
divisions
5th Air Army - two air brigades

The occupied areas along the Hunan-Kwangsi and the Canton-Hankou railways will be secured by approximately eight divisions and four brigades.

Cooperation of the Southern Army

In order to facilitate the operation of the China Expeditionary Army, at an opportune time the Southern Army will carry out an operation on the Lu Chiang front in order to restrain the enemy in the Yunnan area.

If circumstances permit, part of the Southern Army will advance from Langson and cooperate with the China Expeditionary Army in capturing the Nanning area.

During the air operation, at least one air brigade of the 3d Air Army will cooperate with the 5th Air Army.

General Plan for the Employment of Lines of Communication

As few ships as possible will be used during the preparation period of this operation.

In order to perform a mobile operation the following matters will be considered:

Elimination of tropical diseases and those other illnesses attributable to the wet season.

Extensive use of inland water transportation in order to curtail the use of land transportation.

Extensive use of local resources and captured materials.

The principal materials with which the China Expeditionary Army will be supplied are:

Ground ammunition - sufficient for approximately four divisions in one campaign.

Aerial ammunition - sufficient for approximately two air brigades for one month.

Fuel for vehicles - about 40,000 kilolitres (8,803,200 gallons)

Fuel for aircraft - about 10,000 kilolitres (2,200,800 gallons)

Materials for river crossing - 600 pontoons.

The major portion of these materials will be shipped between March and May and the ratio of its accumulation will be:

Central China Area - 6

South China Area - 1

With the progress of the operation the means of transportation for the lines of communication will be converted to water transportation wherever possible. When the main operation is suspended, all available motor transportation will be collected and prepared for operations in other areas.

Other Matters

The various operations will be named:

General Operation

Ichi-Go Operation

Peiping-Hankou Operation Ko-Go Operation

Hunan-Kwangsi Operation To-Go Operation

The first phase of the To-Go Operation will be that leading to the capture of the Kweilin area and the second phase will reopen the road between Kweilin and Langson. The feint operation of the Southern Army from the Lu Chiang front will be known as the Sa-Go Operation.

In view of the deteriorating situation in the Pacific area, Imperial General Headquarters transferred some of its more highly trained divisions from China and Manchuria to the Pacific area. At the same time, plans were made to reinforce the China area for the "Ichi-Go" Operation. The substitutions, transfers and reinforcement of forces in the China area from early February until the commencement of the operation were:

Army, were transferred to the Pacific area, while the 27th Division of the Kwantung Army was assigned to the China Expeditionary Army, which in turn assigned it to the 11th Army. Within the China Expeditionary Army the 37th, 62d and 110th Divisions and the 3d Armored Division were reattached to the 12th Army from the 1st Army, North China Area Army and the Mongolia Garrison Army respectively. The 116th and 22d Divisions of the 13th Army were reattached to the 11th and 23d Armies respectively. The 39th Division and 17th Independent Mixed Brigade of the 11th Army were placed under the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army but still remained under the tactical command of the 11th Army.

During March, 14 independent infantry brigades were newly organized and attached to the various armies in China and, in early May, field replacement units were attached to the various armies.

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Army	Inf Brig	Fd Repl Unit	Unit Designation
Units directly assigned to the China Exped Army	4	5	5th Ind Inf Brig, 7th Ind Inf Brig, 11th Ind Inf Brig, 12th Ind Inf Brig, 1st Fld Repl Unit, 2d Fld Repl Unit, 5th Fld Repl Unit, 9th Fld Repl Unit, 10th Fld Repl Unit
Unit directly assigned to the North China Area Army	1		2d Ind Inf Brig
lst Army	3		3d Ind Inf Brig, 10th Ind Inf Brig, 14th Ind Inf Brig
12th Army	3		lst Ind Inf Brig, 4th Ind Inf Brig, 9th Ind Inf Brig
11th Army			
13th Army	1	2	6th Ind Inf Brig 3d Fld Repl Unit, 4th Fld Repl Unit
23d Army	2	· ·	8th Ind Inf Brig, 13th Ind Inf Brig

Note: The strength of a field replacement unit was equivalent to about one infantry regiment. These units underwent training to replace various units and participated in garrison and combat duties.

The divisions, independent mixed brigades and independent infantry brigades which were placed under the command of the various armies as a result of these transfers prior to the "Ichi-Go" Operation are shown on Chart 1 and Map 3.




Chart No. 1
China Expeditionary Army Strength for "Ichi-Go" Operation

Organization		Units to be Employed			
		D	IMB	IIB	
Units directly assigned to the China Expeditionary Army ¹		1		4	
	lst Army	1	1	3	
North China Area Army	12th Army	5	3 ²	3	
North Area (Mongolia Garrison Army	1	1	89	
	Units under direct command of North China Area Army	1	3	1	
llth Army		8	•		
13th Army		4	-	1	
23d Army		2	3	2	
Total		23	12	14	

- 1. These units were later placed under the command of the 11th Army.
- 2. This figure includes one cavalry brigade.

NOTE:	IMB	 Independent	Mixed Br	igade
	IIB	 Independent	Infantry	Brigade

In mid-February, the 3d Air Division Headquarters in China was redesignated the 5th Air Army Headquarters and, in March, air maintenance and supply units were established in China.

The outline of command of the Air Force in China was as follows:

5th Air Army

1st Air Brig (25th Air Regt - Fighter 85th Air Regt - Fighter) (Reconnaissance and Direct Cooperation) 44th Air Regt 16th Air Regt (Light Bomber) 90th Air Regt (Light Bomber) 18th Indep Air Sq (Headquarters Reconnaissance) (Direct Cooperation) 54th Indep Air Sq 55th Indep Air Sq (Headquarters Reconnaissance) 105th Air Tng Brig (14th, 15th, 18th, 28th, 29th Air Tng Unit) Sector Unit, Signal Unit, Repair Unit, Supply Unit.

Imperial General Headquarters strongly stressed the importance of secrecy in the preparations for the "Ichi-Go" Operation and, in early February, presented the following plan to the commanders of the various areas concerned:

Objective:

It is of utmost importance that the plans for the major operation be kept secret. With the development of preparations for this operation efforts will be made to deceive the enemy by conducting the "Go-Go" Operation.²

Security as to operation, policies, propaganda and counterintelligence will be conducted under a plan which will unify the local and cen-

^{2.} The operation to be directed against Chiang Kai-shek's head-quarters at Chungking was known as "Go-Go" Operation.

tral commands.

Summary:

In order to deceive the enemy it must be made to appear as though the general conduct of the operation is being directed principally from Burma and India.

Security of the various areas will be conducted as follows:

China Expeditionary Army: The China Expeditionary Army will deceive the enemy by concentrating and transferring its forces in such a manner as to indicate that the units are being reorganized, or to make such movements as to indicate that it is transferring its forces to the Southern Area.

During the Feiping-Hankou and Hunan-Kwangsi Operations, the enemy's attention will be diverted toward the "Go-Go" Operation.

Every effort will be made to prevent a sudden increase in shipping transportation for the Canton area.

Southern Army: The Southern Army will conduct its operation in such a way as to lead the enemy to believe that an operation in the Kunming area is contemplated.

Kwantung Army: The transfer of units from the Kwantung Army to China and the Southern Area (by way of Shanghai) will be carried out in such a manner as to make it appear as though these units were being maneuvered or replaced. Various steps will be taken to make the people within and outside the Army believe that these transfers will not jeopardize Japanese defenses against Russia.

Japan: The mobilization and organization of units in Japan will be carried out in such a manner as to make it appear as though these units were being readied for the Southern Operation and

that the troops were being sent to China for a short training period.3

However, in spite of stringent efforts to keep this plan secret, apparently it was known to the enemy.

Operational Command of the China Expeditionary Army

The China Expeditionary Army and the Southern Army drafted their operational plans in detail based on Imperial General Headquarters' plan. In March, they submitted their plans to Imperial General Headquarters, the main items of which are summarized hereunder:

Peiping-Hankou Operation

In mid-April, the main force of the 12th Army, under the command of the North China Area Army, will commence its operation from the area along the Peiping-Hankou railway and, destroying the enemy on the way, will advance to Yencheng. There it will prepare to advance toward Loyang. At the same time, part of the 12th Army will advance toward Hsinyang, when, in concert with a unit from the 11th Army, advancing northward, it will open traffic routes along the Peiping-Hankou railway.

Upon arrival in the Yencheng area, the main force of the 12th Army will wheel to the right and advance toward Loyang where it will annihilate the main force of the Chinese 1st War Sector Army.

In support of the 12th Army's operation, part of the 1st Army will cross the Huang Ho in

^{3.} This plan was reconstructed from the notes of Lt Col Ishiwari, War History Compilation Section of the Army General Staff.

the Yuanchu area and cut the Lunghai railway.

During this operation, an element of the lst Army will create a diversion in the Puchow area, while an element of the 13th Army will conduct a similar action in the Fouyang area.

Troop Strength

12th Army: 37th, 62d and 110th Divisions, 3d Armored Division, 7th Independent Mixed Brigade, 9th Independent Infantry Brigade, and 4th Cavalry Brigade.

1st Army: 59th Infantry Brigade, 3d Independent Mixed Brigade, two battalions of the 26th Division.

11th Army: 11th Independent Infantry Brigade.

Part of the 5th Air Army.

With the advance of the main force of the 12th Army, the 59th Division commander will defend the Shantung Province with the 59th Division, 5th Independent Mixed Brigade, 1st Independent Infantry Brigade and 4th Independent Infantry Brigade.

Railways and roads will be used as lines of communication. The railway bridge over the Huang Ho will be repaired and its air defenses strengthened before the operation gets under way.

Hunan-Kwangsi Operation

The operation will be divided into three phases:

First Phase: Capture of Hengyang

Second Phase: Capture of Kweilin and Liuchowhsien

Third Phase: Capture of Nanning, reopening of the Canton-Hankou railway and capture of airfields at Suichwan and Nanhsiung.

First Phase

Outline of Operation

In the latter part of May 1944 the 11th Army will commence its operation toward the Canton-Hankou railway area. It will use its main strength to destroy the Chinese 9th War Sector Army and an element to destroy the enemy to the west of the Hsiang Chiang. It will then occupy Changsha and Hengyang where it will prepare for an operation toward Kweilin. The unit to be used for this last operation will be a reserve unit not used previously.

Before the operation starts, a Defense Army will be organized temporarily for the defense of the Wuchang-Hankou area. This Army will be placed under the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army and will replace the 11th Army in this area. The replacement is expected to take place in early May.

Troop Strength

llth Army: 3d, 13th, 27th, 34th, 40th, 58th, 68th and 116th Divisions and part of the Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army.

5th Air Army: Main force.

Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army: 39th Division, 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, 5th, 7th, 11th, and 12th Independent Infantry Brigades, 5th, 9th and 10th Field Replacement Units. Units to be attached, if necessary, to the

11th Army: 37th Division (12th Army), 64th Division (13th Army), 1st and 2d Field Replacement Units and Iwamoto Detachment (three infantry battalions of the 13th Army)

The Hsiang Chiang water route will be used extensively for lines of communication and two roads running parallel to the water route will be utilized as auxiliaries. Particular attention will be paid to the air defense of the lines of communication.

During this operation, part of the 13th Army will commence its diversionary operation from the area along the Chekiang-Kiangsi rail-way.

Second Phase

During the second phase of the operation the 11th and 23d Armies will be deployed in parallel lines.

Outline of Operation

After the 11th Army has completed the assembly of its troops and materiel in the vicinity of Hengyang, it will commence its operation from the area along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway. It will advance and capture Kweilin which it will maintain. The 23d Army will advance from both the area along the banks of the Hsi Chiang and the Luichow Peninsula and will capture Liuchowhsien.

Troop Strength

11th Army: In addition to its strength

during the first phase of the operation, the 11th Army will be reinforced by the 37th and 64th Divisions (These divisions may have been attached during the first phase.)

23d Army: 22d and 104th Divisions, 22d and 23d Independent Mixed Brigades.

Main Force of the 5th Air Army.

The 11th Army will use the Hsiang Chiang and other water routes and roads as the main route for lines of communication, while the 23d Army will use the Hsi Chiang for its lines of communication. After the capture of Kweilin and Liuchowhsien, the Hsi Chiang route will be used for transporting supplies to the forces in the captured areas. Railroads in this area will be repaired as quickly as possible in order that they might be used for the same purpose.


Third Phase

Part of the 23d Army will capture Nanning. An element from the 11th Army and one from the 23d Army will occupy vital points along the Canton-Hankou railway and reopen the route. Part of the 11th Army will capture the airfields at Suichwan and Nanhsiung.

Coerational Command of the Southern Army

The Southern Army will, in cooperation with the China Expeditionary Army, contain the enemy from Burma and French Indo-China. (Map 4)

In the Burma area, the 56th Division (Burma Area Army) operating in the Lu Chiang (Salween River) area, will cross the river and occupy Paoshan. It will then continue its march toward



Tali 4

In the French Indo-China area, with the arrival of troops of the China Expeditionary Army in the Nanning area, part of the 21st Division will penetrate into enemy territory and proceed toward Nanning where it will join the China Expeditionary Army. 5

Preparations for the Ichi-Go Operation

During the Chenghsien Operation in Honan Province in 1941, 6 positions were constructed near Pawangcheng and Chungmou, the crossing points of the Huang Ho along the Peiping-Hankou railway in north China. South of the river about one and a half infantry battalions were stationed at Pawangcheng and one infantry company at Chungmou to guard these areas. Although the Huang Ho bridge was destroyed by enemy fire, on 25 March 1944, the North China Area Army repaired the bridge to permit the traffic of light trains and vehicles. The front line advanced and air defense measures were taken to minimize losses.

^{4.} This plan could not be realized as the unfavorable situation in Burma after the Imphal Operation caused the 56th Division to withdraw from the Lu Chiang (For details of the Imphal Operation see Monograph No. 134, Burma Operations Record: Fifteenth Army Operations in Imphal Area.)

^{5.} The operational plan of the Southern Army was reconstructed from information received from Major Yamaguchi, staff officer of the Southern Army at that time.

^{6.} Monograph No. 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941.

During the concentration of forces for this operation, roads were used mainly for movements, however, when the 22d Division was transferred from the 13th Army to the 23d Army, it was moved by sea from Shanghai to Canton.

After participating in the Changte Operation the 116th Division remained in the Wuchang-Hankou area.

In north China, materiel for the operation was transported mainly by railway, while in central China, the Yangtze River and other water routes were used. At that time, lack of ships prevented adequate transportation of supplies to China. The China Expeditionary Army, in an endeavor to solve the transportation problem, not only used every available ship in the area but set up means for the quick construction of ships in Shanghai. Air defenses were constructed along the Yangtze River to combat the frequent air raids in that area.

As the level of the Yangtze River at this time was high, it was necessary to exercise caution in the use of water transportation.

Although this delayed the transportation of munitions to some extent, generally this phase of the operation was completed as planned. Troop concentration via roads along the banks of the Yangtze River was performed smoothly and, in fact, far exceeded expectations. However, due to the inefficiency of its convoy escort, sea transportation along


^{7.} Monograph No. 71, Army Operations in China, Dec 1941 - Dec 1943.

the coast of the South China Sea was delayed for approximately two weeks.

By 15 April, the major part of the defense units had arrived in the Wuchang-Hankou area and, by the 25th, all units had arrived.

By 10 May, all units participating in the operation, were in position to attack and, on the same day, the Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army was completely organized and assigned the defense of that area.

The 5th Air Army in north China established its bases at Anyang, Tungshan, Hsinhsiang and Kaifeng. The fighter unit established at Hsinhsiang airfield was assigned the mission of protecting the bridges in the Pawangcheng area. In central and south China, the main force of the air units defended the Yangtze River and the Hong Kong area and attacked the enemy air force whenever possible. Fighters using the airfields in the Wuchang-Hankou area as their main base and the airfield at Pailochi, northeast of Yoyang as an advance base, made night sorties on important enemy bases at Hengyang, Suichuan and Kweilin with considerable success.



Chapter 2

Peiping-Hankou Operation

Estimate of the Situation Prior to the Operation

In spite of all the precautions taken to keep preparations for the Peiping-Hankou Operation secret, during the early part of 1944, the enemy, apparently aware that the operation was impending, completed their fortifications in the area and strengthened their forces by the redeployment of troops on a large scale. At the same time, they carried out intensive guerrilla warfare in the southern part of north China and made diversionary attacks in the Wuchang-Hankou area.

In the Honan sector it appeared as though General Tang En-po's Armyl (consisting of nine or ten armies) would counter any Japanese advances. It was also estimated that five or six of these armies would be deployed to defend the Huang Ho and secure key positions along the Peiping-Hankou railway, while the superior mobile force (three armies) which was being held in reserve in the Yuhsien-Linju area would attempt systematic counterattacks from its already constructed positions in that area. Furthermore, in the Loyang area, it was felt that as the operation developed the enemy might counterattack with the three to five armies already in that vicinity and that they might possibly be reinforced by an additional two or three armies from the Sth War Sector Army.

^{1.} Monograph No. 179, <u>Central China Area Operations Record</u>, 1937 - 1941, footnote 59.

Further, it was estimated that two or three armies from the 5th War Sector would assist the 1st War Sector Army.

Under these circumstances, between 18 and 20 enemy armies totalling 350,000 - 400,000 men (half of which would be under the direct command of the Central Government Army²) would participate in the major eperation.

Japanese strength for the operation was three divisions, four independent brigades, one armored division and one cavalry brigade (approximately 148,000 men). However, in spite of the fact that the Japanese strength was less than half that of the enemy, it was felt that in view of their operational experience in the past, the aims of the operation would be achieved.

Operational Plan

The North China Area Army was ordered to concentrate its forces as follows:

The 1st Army will place the 59th Infantry Brigade and the 3d Independent Mixed Brigade under the command of the 69th Division commander. These units will concentrate in the vicinity of Yuanchu and Pailangtu. Prior to the operation by the 12th Army, the 1st Army will direct one regiment, composed of new recruits from Japan, to concentrate and prepare to go into action at Puchow and another at Ani.

^{2.} Ibid: footnote 66.

The 12th Army will concentrate the 37th Division and the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade at Kaifeng and to the north of the town, the 62d and 110th Divisions on both sides of the rail-road on the north side of the Huang Ho bridge and the 9th Independent Infantry Brigade in the area around Chihsien. In order to mislead the enemy, the 27th Division will concentrate around Chinghuachen and Chinyang and the 3d Armored Division will concentrate along the Peiping-Hankou railway, north of the assembly area of the 9th Independent Infantry Brigade. The 4th Cavalry Brigade will advance directly from its present location (Headquarters at Shangchiu) to the Pawangcheng bridge.

At dawn on 18 April, the 37th Division and the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade will cross the New Huang Ho in the Chungmou area and advance toward the southern Chenghsien area while the 62d and 110th Divisions together with the 9th Independent Infantry Brigade will penetrate enemy positions on the Pawangcheng front and advance toward the area southwest of Chenghsien. As many enemy troops as possible will be destroyed in the Chenghsien area.

With the arrival of the main force of the 12th Army at Chenghsien, the 3d Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade will advance quickly to the southern part of the Huang Ho. The main force will continue its movement south, annihilating the enemy as it advances, until it arrives at Yencheng. Here this force will prepare for a drive against Loyang. Part of the force will advance quickly to Hsinyang and open the road along the Peiping-Hankou railway. When this road is opened for traffic, the 27th Division (which it is planned to use later in the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation³) will be transferred to the Wuchang-Hankou area.

^{3.} See page 68.

When the main force of the 12th Army reaches Yencheng, it will turn right and drive toward Loyang where it will annihilate the main force of the 1st War Sector Army.

An element of the 5th Air Army will give direct support to this operation and, should the necessity arise, use powerful elements in its support of the Army.


The 1st Army will divert the enemy at Puchow and the 13th Army will advance to the Fouyang area and divert the enemy there.

The main operation is expected to be completed by the latter part of May.

Progress of Operation (Map 6 and 7)

On the night of 17 April, the main force of the 37th Division crossed the Huang Ho and advanced toward Chungmou. By dawn of the 18th it had penetrated the enemy positions and advanced to a small river approximately three kilometers south of Chungmou. There it halted to prepare for the subsequent operation. Meanwhile, a unit of the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade, which had crossed the Huang Ho at the same time as the 37th Division, attacked the flank of the enemy facing the crossing point of the main body of the Brigade. Shortly after dawn the main body of the Brigade began crossing the river at a point near the left flank of the 37th Division. Part of the 37th Division advanced to Chenghsien, routing the enemy as they advanced, while the main force of the Division advanced to Heincheng

^{4.} This plan was reconstructed from the notes made by Lt Col Ishiwari, War History Compilation Section of the Army General Staff.



by way of Kuotien. The 7th Independent Mixed Brigade advanced to Hsincheng through Liutien. By the evening of the 19th, a unit of the Division had occupied Chenghsien.

On the morning of the 19th, in the area along the Peiping-Hankou railway, the 110th Division pushed forward its position to the Pawangcheng front and prepared to attack. The 62d Division, which was deployed on the left wing of the 110th Division, advanced toward Yencheng and the 9th Independent Infantry Brigade, which was deployed on the right wing of the 110th Division, advanced toward Ssushui. The 110th Division then advanced toward Mihsien. On the 21st, it occupied Jungyang and, on the 24th, Mihsien.

Also on 24 April, the 62d Division, the 37th Division and the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade advanced to the east-west line of Hsincheng and prepared to attack Hsuchang. The 9th Independent Infantry Brigade, having routed the enemy at Ssushui, on the 24th, advanced to the sector southwest of this town.

On 30 April, the main force of the 12th Army opened its attack against Hsuchang and, on 1 May, occupied the area.

On the afternoon of 30 April, the 62d Division encountered the newly organized Chinese 15th and 29th Armies (which had begun their drive toward Hsuchang) at Yingchiaochen and repulsed them.


The 27th Division, 3d Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade, which had assembled in the northern sector of the Huang Ho as second-

line units, immediately followed the first-line units across the Huang Ho railway bridge. On the 26th, the second-line units at first headed south, but, under orders from the North China Area Army, the 12th Army ordered the 3d Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to change their direction of advance to the north-west. At the same time, a unit of the 37th Division (two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion) and the 27th Division continued southward in order to reopen the Peiping-Hankou railway. On 5 May they captured Yencheng. On the 8th, the 27th Division occupied Suiping and on the 11th, arrived at Chuehshan. At Chuehshan, the Division was placed under the command of the 11th Army.

On 1 May, having been ordered by the 11th Army to head northward to reopen the Peiping-Hankou railway, the 11th Independent Infantry Brigade left Changtaikuan and, by 3 May, had advanced to Hsinantien. There it received information that the enemy in the vicinity of Chuehshan was weak. One element, therefore, headed north and occupied Chuehshan, while the remainder of the Brigade advanced to Chumatien.

Detour Operation toward Loyang

Earlier in the operation the Chinese 15th and 85th Armies had defended the shores of the Huang Ho while the 177th Division had been concentrated on the Ssushui front. With the capture of Chuehshan, Tang En-po's Army (13th, 85th and 38th Armies) were concentrated



north and south of Tengfeng. Seven divisions of the South Group were disposed in the vicinity of Hsuchang, Yuhsien and Hsiangcheng, the 89th Army was in the area between Yencheng and Suiping, the 78th Army around Wuyang and Yehhsien, while part of the 8th War Sector Army had advanced to the east.

As the North China Area Army estimated that Tang En-po would assemble his main force near Yehhsien, it planned to advance to Yencheng and then wheel to the northwest in order to capture this force. However, the main force of the 31st Army Group (Tang En-po's Army Group) turned its advance to the north. The Area Army, therefore, changed its plan and decided to turn toward Loyang directly after the capture of Hsuchang, rather than to wait until Yencheng was captured. It ordered its main force to advance toward Shanhsien in order to defeat the 31st Army Group, particularly the 13th Army (main force of the Army Group), while elements of the Area Army were to destroy the enemy at Tengfeng, Yuhsien and Hsiangcheng.

On 1 and 2 May, the 12th Army prepared to launch its attack. It ordered the 110th Division to destroy the enemy at Tengfeng and Tachintien, while the 62d Division was to defeat the Chinese 29th Army southeast of Yuhsien and then attack and destroy the enemy at Yuhsien. The 3d Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade were ordered to pursue the enemy toward Shanhsien and Linju, the main force of the 37th Division was to advance toward Shanhsien and the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade toward Hsiangcheng. (Map 8)

On 3 May, the 62d Division attacked and defeated the Chinese 29th Army at Yuhsien. The 3d Armored Division routed the retreating enemy heading west and, on the 4th, mopped up the enemy in the vicinity of Linju.

On 2 May, the 4th Cavalry Brigade defeated the enemy force in the sector southwest of Yingchiaochen and, on the 4th, advanced to the sector northwest of Linju. Also on the 4th, the 37th Division arrived at Linju. On the same day, the 110th Division attacked and destroyed enemy positions in the eastern sector of Tengfeng and the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade occupied Hsiangcheng.

The 12th Army then deployed its main force to envelop and destroy the 13th and 29th Armies of the 31st Army Group around Tengfeng and in the mountains south of Tengfeng, while elements were disposed to check the enemy escaping to the southwest. The 110th and 62d Divisions were ordered to attack the enemy from the east and southeast, while the 3d Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Division were deployed between Linjuchen and Lungmenchieh in order to cut the enemy's line of retreat. At the same time, the main force of the 37th Division was stationed at Linju and the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade was ordered to attack the enemy near Lushan.

At midnight of 5 May, the enemy began to retreat toward Taying and Changshuichen by way of the eastern sector of Linju. On the 7th, the 12th Army ordered the 37th Division and the 7th Independent Mixed

Brigade to destroy the enemy around Taying. On the 8th, this force enveloped the enemy and, assisted by the 44th Air Regiment, attacked it inflicting heavy casualties. Due to the slow movement of the 3d Armored Division, however, the greater part of the enemy force escaped toward Changshuichen.

It was estimated that the 1st War Sector Army was regrouping its main forces along the Loyang-Iyang line and planning to attack the Japanese Army heading toward Loyang from the north and south. The North China Area Army, therefore, decided to destroy this force around Loyang. On 9 May, it ordered the 12th Army to advance toward Loyang and Hsinan and, using its main force, annihilate the enemy to the northwest. At the same time, it ordered the 1st Army to cross the Huang Ho near Yuanchu. The main force of the 1st Army was then to advance toward Hsinan in order to cut off the enemy's retreat while an element was to move toward Hsiashihchen. The Area Army also ordered the 63d Division (composed of the 9th Independent Infantry Brigade and other units) at Ssushui, to advance toward Hsinan through the district north of Loyang.

Having defeated the enemy in the sector southwest of Tengfeng, the 12th Army continued to keep the enemy in the Loyang area under strict observation while, at the same time, it ordered the 110th Division to pursue the enemy toward Iyang, the 62d Division to pursue them toward Pingteng, the main force of the 3d Armored Division toward Iyang and Hsinan and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the western sec-

tor of Pingteng.

The 1st Army placed the 59th Infantry Brigade and the 3d Independent Mixed Brigade under the command of the 69th Division commander and, on the night of 9 May, the brigades crossed the Huang Ho at a point west of Yuanchu and at the Pailangtu ferry respectively. On the 11th, the 59th Infantry Brigade penetrated Mienchih and advanced toward Hsinan, while the 3d Independent Mixed Brigade headed west toward Hsiashihchen, which it occupied on the 12th.

Along the Huang Ho, on 24 April, the 9th Independent Infantry Brigade had captured the area around Ssushui and advanced to a sector southwest of the town. Here the Brigade engaged the Chinese 177th Division, which had been reinforced. Fighting continued for some time but the Brigade was unable to defeat the Division. The Area Army, therefore, reinforced the Brigade with the 12th Field Replacement Unit and a Composite Unit, extracted from the various units, at the same time placing these units together with the Brigade under the command of the 63d Division commander (Lt Gen Nozoe). On 5 May, this unit (Nozoe Unit) was placed under the direct command of the Area Army commander. After defeating the 177th Division, the unit advanced toward the road between Chenghsien and Loyang. On 12 May, it advanced to the northeastern sector of Loyang and then continued west.

This unit, together with the 59th Infantry Brigade of the 1st Army, attacked the enemy at Hsinan from the east and west and, on 14 May, captured the town.

On 14 May, the North China Area Army commander decided to capture the enemy in the Lo Ho valley, encircle Loyang as quickly as possible and occupy it at an opportune moment. It, therefore, directed the 12th Army to continue its advance toward the Lo Ho valley. It further ordered the 12th Army to place its Guard Unit south of Loyang under the command of the 63d Division commander and ordered the Division to seize Loyang. The 1st Army was ordered to pursue the enemy toward the sector west of Iyang. At this time, the 9th Independent Infantry Brigade was placed under the command of the 1st Army.

The main force of the 12th Army continued to pursue the enemy toward the Lo Ho valley and, on 14 May, the 37th Division of the 12th Army occupied Sunghsien. The two raiding units of the 37th Division then advanced from Sunghsien to Loning and Lushih respectively in order to cut the enemy's line of retreat. Defeating the retreating enemy on the way, by 20 May, these units had advanced to Lushih.


After the capture of Hsinan, the main force of the 1st Army continued to pursue the enemy toward the sector southwest of Hsinan and advanced to the sector west of Iyang. On the 18th, in accordance with an Area Army order, the main force of the 1st Army was transferred from the vicinity of Iyang to the sector east of Shanhsien via Kuanyintang. On the same day, the 3d Independent Mixed Brigade of the 1st Army occupied Shanhsien. The main force of the 1st Army then continued its advance westward and occupied Taying. Here the advance was checked by a powerful enemy force.

Capture of Loyang

On 19 May, the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to place the main force of the 3d Armored Division together with part of the 110th Division under the command of the 63d Division commander. At the same time, the 63d Division was ordered to defend the railway east of Mienchih.

On 19 May, the 63d Division initiated its attack against enemy positions on the outskirts of Loyang, however, the enemy positions were so strong that the battle situation did not progress as planned. On the 20th, therefore, the Area army ordered the 12th Army to capture Loyang and placed the 63d Division under the command of the 12th Army. At 1300 hours on the 23d, the 12th Army disposed the 63d Division (composed mainly of six infantry battalions, two tank companies and three artillery battalions) to attack Loyang Castle from the north and northeastern fronts of Loyang to the northeastern corner of the castle while the 3d Armored Division (composed mainly of six infantry battalions and two artillery battalions) was to attack the castle from the western front toward the northwestern corner of the castle. The Army also directed the Cavalry Brigade (with two infantry companies attached) to capture and destroy the enemy which it was expected would flee to the south at the line of the Lo Ho. (Map 9)

On the 24th, the Army-called on the enemy in Loyang to surrender but the enemy refused. At 1300 hours, therefore, the Army opened



its attack and, on the 25th, completely occupied the castle.

After this operation, the China Expeditionary Army extended the boundary line between the operational zone of the North China Area Army and the Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army to the Fouyang-Hsihsien-Changtaikuan-Tungpai-Hsiangyang line.

Diversionary Operation

In compliance with orders from the China Expeditionary Army, in order to divert the enemy, the 13th Army ordered the 65th Division to carry out an operation in the Fouyang area.

By 24 April, the 65th Division had concentrated its forces in the vicinity of Chengyangkuan. On the 25th, it crossed the Huai Ho and advanced north and, on the 27th, having routed the enemy cavalry on the way, occupied Yingshang. It continued to advance destroying small enemy forces on the way and, on 6 May, occupied Liushihlipu.

The 13th Army, however, did not observe any enemy movement as a result of this feint operation.


At this time, the North China Area Army had already captured Yencheng and was marching south without hindrance from the enemy. The 13th Army felt that should the 65th Division advance further and occupy Fouyang it would not assist the North China Area Army's operation. Therefore, after consultation with the Expeditionary Army, on the latter's authority the 65th Division was ordered to suspend its operation and return to its original station. On 8 May, the Di-

vision commenced to withdraw and between the 13th and 14th concentrated its forces in the Shouhsien-Chengyangkuan sector. (Map 9)

Casualties sustained from the initiation of the operation until the capture of Loyang were: 869 men killed in action and 2,280 men wounded.⁵

^{5.} Information in regard to this operation was obtained from telegrams sent from the North China Area Army to the 12th Army. Copies of these telegrams are in the files of the 1st Demobilization Bureau.

GENERAL REFERENCE MAP - CHAPTER 3 MAP NO. 10



Chapter 3

Hunan-Kwangsi Operation

Estimate of the Enemy Situation and Operational Plan

It was estimated that the enemy in Hunan Province would oppose the Japanese advance to Changsha, especially in the area south of Changsha by concentrating its strength there and taking advantage of the fortifications already constructed in that sector. Part of the 6th War Sector Army would be dispatched to this area as reinforcements. An element from these reinforcements would attempt to push back the Japanese forces in the Iyang area, while its main force, which would arrive in increments, would attack the Japanese flank from the district west of Changsha. Enemy strength in this area was estimated to be in the vicinity of 13 or 14 armies (approximately 40 divisions).

Further, it was estimated that the enemy would attempt to check the Japanese advance in the Hengyang area by air and ground counterattacks and that, even under the most adverse circumstances, it would make every effort to hold. Approximately 20 armies (about 55 divisions) including a probable 14 or 15 armies of the Central Command, were believed to be defending the area.

Depending upon the development of operations in north Burma, the enemy Yunnan Expeditionary Army might be transferred to this area. It was believed most likely that this army would be employed if the fall of Hengyang seemed imminent.

After a study of the terrain and the estimate of the enemy situation, the 11th Army made the following operational plan:

The troops will be divided into two groups as follows:

First-line group:

Five divisions will be deployed in parallel along a line from Huayon to a point south of Toyang and Chungyang. The 40th Division will be deployed in the sector west of the Hsiang Chiang, while the 116th, 68th, 3d and 13th Divisions will be deployed in the sector east of this river. (The better trained divisions will be placed so as to combat the concentrated assaults of the enemy.)

Second-line group:


The 58th Division will be deployed in the Chienli sector; the 34th Division in the sector southwest of Puchi and 27th Division, (still en route) on arrival will be disposed in the Chungyang area.


On 27 and 28 May, the Army will open its attack and destroy the enemy located at Yuan-chiang and Tyang and also between the Hsinchiang Ho and the Ku Shui.

Elements of the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 5th Independent Infantry Brigade and the 109th Infantry Regiment will cover the right flank of the Army by advancing to the Sungtzu Ho and diverting the 6th War Sector Army.

The second-line group will participate in the decisive battle and will then mop up the remaining enemy in the rear and repair roads.

After defeating the enemy in the Ku Shui sector, the Army will pursue the enemy to the





Laotao Ho line and there prepare to seize Ninghsiang, Changsha and Liuyang, the enemy's main defense line.

To facilitate the attack on Changsha, Mt. Yuehlushan west of Changsha must be captured. For this purpose a powerful force will be dispatched to the left bank of the Hsiang Chiang in order to capture the mountain and cooperate with the group directly attacking Changsha.

The 3d Division and the 13th Division will enclose and attack Liuyang from the northwest and southeast, respectively.

After penetrating the enemy lines along the Liuyang Ho, the Army will prepare for an attack on Hengyang and, at the same time, will destroy the enemy which it is expected will be concentrated from the east, west and south. The transportation of war materiel, especially heavy artillery, will be accelerated in preparation for the capture of Hengyang. After the enemy has been neutralized by fire power, the Army will attack Hengyang. Alternatively, advantage may be taken of the capture of Changsha and the Army may rapidly pursue the retreating enemy and assault Hengyang.

The plan was put into operation and progress was as shown on Maps 11 and 12.

Operation Prior to the Occupation of Changsha and Liuyang

In order to push back the enemy along the west bank of the Hsiang Chiang and from the area north of the Ku Shui to the Hsiang Chiang and the Ku Shui, the 11th Army drew up the following plan:

The 40th Division will commence its operation on 28 May. The main force of this division will move from the Nanhsien area, while an element will move from the Huayon sector, pass

through the district west of Tachengssu and advance toward Sanhsienhushih. The Division will then attack and destroy the enemy in this area.

On the same day, the 109th Infantry Regiment will open its operation. It will march rapidly toward Anshang, destroying the enemy on the way.

In order to divert the enemy the 5th Independent Infantry Brigade, plus two battalions from the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, will advance to the Sungtzu Ho line.

On the night of 27 May, the 216th Infantry Regiment will leave Yoyang, cross the Tungting Hu and advance along the Ku Shui. It will move rapidly in the direction of Changlochieh in order to cut the enemy's retreat route and to support the river crossing of the 68th Division.

The 116th Division will commence its attack on the night of the 27th and advance to the vicinity of Kueii and Hsinshih on the southern bank of the Ku Shui.

On the same night, the main force of the 68th Division will penetrate the sector to the east of Hsinchiang and advance to the southern bank of the Ku Shui below Changlochieh.

At dawn on 27 May, the 3d and 13th Divisions will open their attacks. The 3d Division will advance from the sector along the Chungyang-Nanchiang-Pingchiang road to the sector southeast of Pingchiang. The 13th Division will advance toward Changshouchieh. A powerful element of this division will be dispatched to the sector southwest of Pingchiang to cooperate with the 3d Division in carrying out a raiding attack in order to destroy the enemy.

On 28 May, the 34th Division will commence its advance. It will pass through the Hsinchiang sector and advance to the district north of Kueii.

On 28 May the 58th Division will start from Chienli. On the 30th, it will cross the Yangtze River. From there it will advance to the sector north of the Hsinchiang Ho, south of Yoyang.

The 5th Air Army will directly support the river-crossing operation of the 68th and 116th Divisions in the Hsinchiang sector and the penetration of enemy positions. It will also support the amphibious operation of the 216th Infantry Regiment and, at the same time, cover the southward advance of the ground and ship units. In the Ku Shui area the Air Army will destroy the retreating enemy and directly cooperate with the ground units in combat.

A mine-sweeping unit of the Navy will start from Yoyang, sweep the Hsiang Chiang for mines and install buoys to establish a safe water route.

Each Army group commenced its advance as ordered. The enemy, however, began to withdraw prior to the attack. Its main force appeared to have withdrawn to the east and to the hills on the south bank of the Ku Shui. In the Kuanwangchiao area and on the south bank of the Ku Shui, the Chinese 20th Army put up organized resistance for several days but, with this exception, the Chinese did not resist the lith Army's advance. As the enemy appeared to have continued its withdrawal to the Laotao Ho, on 3 June the lith Army, began to advance from the Ku Shui line. It pursued the retreating enemy and, on the 6th, reached the Laotao Ho where it began preparations for an attack on Changsha and Liuyang. In view of the general situation, the lith Army deemed it necessary to surround Changsha as soon as possible.

The Chinese 99th Army (approximately two divisions) was disposed in the Tamoshan Range. On 2 June, the 11th Army ordered the 34th Division to attack the range from Hsinshih with its main force and from Kueii with an element. The following day, the Division attacked, however, the enemy resisted strongly and the attack did not develop as anticipated. On the 5th, the Army ordered the main force of the Division to make a detour around the southern foot of the range and advance to the Taikungchiao-Hsiangyin sector. The enemy continued to resist and the division was ordered to discontinue the attack and advance southward in the direction of Changsha.

As the enemy appeared to be retreating from the western side of the Tamoshan Range to the left bank of the Hsiang Chiang, the 11th Army ordered an element of the 40th Division to occupy several strategic points, including Chiaokou, along the left bank of the Hsiang Chiang.

In order to facilitate the upstream advance of the 216th Infantry Regiment, as well as the transportation of heavy artillery and other materiel to be used during the Changsha Operation, it was essential that Hsiangyin and Yingtien and the areas along both banks of the Hsiang Chiang be occupied to prevent the enemy blockading the advance. An element (three infantry battalions of the 62d Infantry Brigade) of the 58th Division was ordered to advance through Kueii toward Hsiangyin and, in cooperation with the 34th Division, to annihilate the enemy and occupy Hsiangyin. On 8 June, this element occupied Hsiangyin.

According to a prearranged plan, the 11th Army used the 27th Division to repair the Chungyang-Tungcheng-Pingchiang-Liuyang road and all engineer regiments under the direct command of the Field Engineer commander to repair the Hsinchiang-Hsinshih-Maanpu-Changsha road. Continuous rains, however, greatly delayed the road work and turned the roads into a sea of mud. Lines of communication became extremely difficult to maintain and, until the middle of June, the Japanese first-line troops received very few supplies from the rear. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the Army to improve these two roads, they eventually had to be abandoned. The situation became critical as all field artillery and motor units became congested on the muddy Yoyang-Changsha road.

In order to prepare for an attack on the Chinese forces in the Changsha area, therefore, the 11th Army decided first to destroy the forces in the Iyang-Liuyang sector and, on 7 June, issued the following orders:

The 40th Division will defeat the enemy in the Iyang area and then advance to Ninghsiang where it will seek out and destroy the enemy.

The 109th Infantry Regiment attached to the 40th Division, will occupy the Yuanchiang sector in order to cover the rear of the Army. One infantry battalion each will occupy the districts south of Changpai Hu and Chuliangchiao respectively to protect the water transportation route between Lintzukou and Chingchiang.

The 58th, 68th and 116th Divisions will deploy from a point 20 kilometers south of Maanpu

to Peishengtseng by 11 June and prepare to attack the enemy along the banks of the Liuyang Ho.

At daybreak on 10 June, the 3d and 13th Divisions will commence their attacks against the enemy in the Liuyang sector. The 3d Division will advance toward the sector northwest of Liuyang, while the 13th Division, in order to cooperate in destroying the enemy, will penetrate the enemy lines in the area around Yachishih.

To prepare for the attack on Changsha, the 34th Division will discontinue its attack on the enemy in the Tamoshan Range at a suitable time. About 10 June it will cross the Hsiang Chiang at a point south of Hsianingchiang and there make preparations for an attack on Mt. Yuehlushan. The Shima Detachment (three infantry battalions commanded by the Brigade commander from the 68th Division) will cross the Hsiang Chiang in the Paishachou area on the night of the 11th and there prepare for an attack on Fengshupu.

On 11 June, the 40th Division occupied Iyang. Also on the 11th, the 58th, 68th and 116th Divisions opened their attacks from the Laotao Ho against the enemy disposed along the banks of the Liuyang Ho and meeting with little resistance occupied these positions by the morning of the 12th. On the same day, the 11th Army decided to capture Hsiangtan and Chuchou, to which areas the enemy appeared to be retreating. The 116th Division was ordered to advance southward along the Canton-Hankou railway and occupy all important points along the railway.

^{1.} On 10 June a revised order changed the objective to Kueitou-shih.

Previously, on 10 June, the 3d and 13th Divisions had opened their attacks from the north and south on the enemy entrenched in the steep hillside positions around Liuyang and the Army now ordered the 68th Division to advance to Kuanchiao to cut the route of the enemy retreating from Liuyang. On 14 June, the enemy in the Liuyang sector was completely defeated and Changsha was isolated.

The Army ordered the main force of the 116th Division to advance and attack the enemy in the district west of Isuho; the 68th Division was ordered to defeat the enemy in the Kuanchiao area and then advance to Chaoling, south of Chuchou, while the 13th Division was ordered to pursue the enemy toward Liling.

On 16 June, the 58th Division opened its attack against Changsha and on the 18th captured the town. Also on the 16th, the 34th Division and the Shima Detachment opened their attack on Mt. Yuehlushan. Meanwhile on the west bank of the Hsiang Chiang, on the 11th, the 40th Division occupied Iyang and, on the 16th, having defeated the Chinese 73d and 74th Armies, captured Ninghsiang.

After the Japanese 3d and 13th Divisions had defeated the Chinese newly organized 3d Army as well as the 20th, 27th, 37th, 58th,
and 114th Armies in the vicinity of Liuyang, on 18 June, the 13th Division occupied Liling. A report was then received that, on the 14th,
the Chinese 26th Army had penetrated to Finghsiang. On the 20th, the
11th Army ordered the 13th Division to advance to Pinghsiang and destroy this army. The 13th Division immediately left Liling and ad-

vanced toward Pinghsiang and, on 22 June, having defeated the 26th Army, occupied Pinghsiang.

Hengyang Operation (Map 13)

To take advantage of the capture of Changsha and the collapse of the enemy, the 11th Army decided to advance an element to Heng-yang while the main force was preparing for future operations. It, therefore, published the following order:

The 40th Division will capture Hsianghsiang as soon as possible.


A powerful element of the 116th Division will advance to the sector south of Hsianghsiang in order to cooperate with the 40th Division in the capture of this town. The main force of the 116th Division will advance from the vicinity of Isuho and an element from the Hsianghsiang district through Paikwoshih to the district west of Hengyang.

The main force of the 68th Division will advance from the east bank and the Shima Detachment from the west bank of the Hsiang Chiang to Hengyang.

The main force of the 13th Division will prepare to advance to the district south of Yuhsien.

An element of the 3d Division will remain in the Liuyang sector until it is relieved by the 27th Division. The main force of the 3d Division will advance through Shanglishih and Pinghsiang. It will detour through the district south of Liling and seek out and destroy the enemy in that area.

The 216th Infantry Regiment in the Changsha area will prepare to advance upstream along the Hsiang Chiang to Hengyang.



On 22 June, the 40th Division, supported by an element of the 116th Division, occupied Hsianghsiang and, on the 27th, the main force of the 116th Division arrived in the sector northwest of Hengyang. On the 26th, the 68th Division advanced south along the Canton-Hankou railway and, on the same day, an element of this division occupied the Hengyang airfield on the east bank of the Hsiang Chiang. On the 27th, the main force of the division crossed the Hsiang Chiang near Tungyangtu and advanced to the district southwest of Hengyang. On the 28th, the 116th and 68th Divisions commenced the attack on Hengyang. The following day, the Shima Detachment from the northwest and the 216th Infantry Regiment from the northeast opened their attacks on the town. The offensive, however, did not progress satisfactorily. The 68th Division commander and his chief of staff were among the wounded and the casualties were heavy. On the 30th, all troops were placed under the command of the 116th Division commander and the offensive renewed but still with little success. Army ordered the 40th Division to capture Youngfeng immediately in order that a powerful element of this division might be sent to Chakiang. It also ordered the advance of the artillery unit to Hengyang to be accelerated.

On 23 June, the 11th Army had ordered the 13th Division to advance to Leiyang and cut the Canton-Hankou railway and the 3d Division, after completing its mopping-up operation in Finghsiang, to

assemble at Liling. On 26 June, the 64th Division arrived at Yoyang. Three infantry battalions of this division were ordered to Hsiang-hsiang immediately and its main force to Changsha to relieve the front-line groups of their rear guard duties. The 1st Field Replacement Unit was ordered to discontinue repair work on the Yoyang-Hsingchiang-Changsha road and was given the mission of guarding the district south of Changsha.

On 2 July, the 11th Army decided to suspend its attack on Hengyang for the time being and accelerate the advance of its artillery unit. The attack was not to be renewed until such time as a powerful air attack could be launched at the same time as the ground attack.

The following are considered the principal reasons for the unsuccessful assaults on Hengyang: the difficult terrain, combined with the skilfully organized, strong enemy positions and the enemy's determination to resist; shortage of ammunition and insufficient concentration of heavy weapons for attacks on fortifications as well as superior enemy air strength. (Although at this time the Japanese Air Force controlled the skies in the area to the north of Hengyang they had not advanced their bases to Changsha and Hsiangtan.)

As from the standpoint of the over-all situation the capture of Hengyang was not important, the 11th Army suspended its attack and disposed its forces in this area as follows:

Hengyang Sector: At the beginning of July a large enemy force

began to advance gradually to the northeast from the area along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway, southwest of Hengyang and to threaten the rear of the Japanese troops in that sector. In order to check this force one battalion of the 116th Division occupied Maotungchiao. By mid-July, however, this Japanese unit was completely enveloped by the enemy and the situation became critical.

Sector West of Hsiang Chiang: On 4 July, the 40th Division occupied Youngfeng. The 11th Army then ordered this Division to occupy Chakiang and to advance to Chinlanssu, destroying the enemy to the south of Youngfeng. On 6 July, the Division advanced to Chakiang when, in view of the situation at Maotungchiao, the Army ordered it to advance toward Hengyang.

As the 116th Division had suffered very heavy casualties, an element of the 64th Division was dispatched to Yuanchiang to relieve the 109th Infantry Regiment which in turn was ordered to follow up the 116th Division.

Sector East of the Hsiang Chiang: On 4 July, the 13th Division captured Leiyang.

Due to bad weather, the 27th Division had completed the lines of communication roads in this area only as far as Pingchiang. On 20 June, the 11th Army had ordered an element of this Division to mop up the enemy in the area north of Liuyang and, on 5 July, ordered the Division to discontinue repair work on the roads and advance south to

secure Liling and Yuhsien. On 15 July, the Division arrived at Liling. At the same time, the 2d Field Replacement Unit, together with the 27th Division, was ordered to garrison the Liuyang area.

Hsiang Chiang Bank Sector: On 7 July, the 11th Army deployed the A.A.A. units in the Hengyang-Hsiang Chiang bank sector in order to defend this area.

As the transportation of cannon and ammunition from the rear to the front and the preparations of the air units were completed by 10 July, the 11th Army reopened the attack on Hengyang on the 11th. Special emphasis was placed on the southwestern front of Hengyang where several advanced enemy positions were to be captured and a pincer movement of the flanks to be closed. On 15 July, the main offensive was launched. Although some territory was captured, the combat situation became confused and the operation did not progress as planned.

Due to these repeated failures to take Hengyang, the 11th Army decided to resume the attack only after it had fully replenished its first-line fighting strength and from mid-July steadily proceeded with its preparations.

On 17 July, an element of the 13th Division secured the airfield on the east bank of Hengyang and important points on the railway near the town. On the 18th, the main force of the Division advanced to this area. At this time, the element of the 68th Division garrison-

ing this area was relieved and returned to its parent organization.

On 22 July, three infantry battalions of the 58th Division were placed under the command of the 116th Division commander, while the main force of the 58th Division was ordered to repair the Changsha-Hengyang road in order that it might be used for motor transportation. After completing the repairs to this road as far as Hengyang, on 27 July, the 58th Division was ordered to participate in the attack against Hengyang.

Four 15-cm howitzers and four 10-cm cannon were brought forward to be used in the assault on Hengyang.

In order to frustrate any counterattacks by the Chinese 9th War Sector Army in the wide area around Leiyang, Pinghsiang and Liuyang, the 11th Army planned to use its troops in this area as follows:

Sector East of the Hsiang Chiang: On 17 July, the 34th Division which had been engaged in mopping up the enemy remaining north of Yunganshih was ordered to advance to the district southeast of Liling and to cooperate with the 27th Division in attacking the enemy in that area.

On 25 July, the 3d Division, having defeated the enemy southeast of Chaling, was ordered to prepare for the Hengyang Operation. Its main force was to advance to Leiyang, while an element was to secure Chaling, Yuhsien and Anjen.

In order to defeat the enemy in the vicinity of Pinghsiang and advance to the Lienhwa and Chaling areas to annihilate the powerful

elements of the 9th War Sector Army entrenched there, the 34th Division was ordered to advance through the district north and east of and along the Liling-Hsiangtung-Lienhwa road while the 27th Division was to advance through the district south and west of the road. On 26 July, these divisions launched their attack from a line north and south through Hsiangtung. The Chinese 58th Army suffered heavy casualties and retreated. To facilitate the advance of the 3d Division to Leiyang, the Japanese forces continued to pursue and destroy the retreating enemy.

Sector West of the Hsiang Chiang: On 18 July, the main force of the 64th Division assembled in the Ninghsiang sector to prepare for an attack on Hengshih, while elements checked enemy counterattacks against the Iyang area. On the 22d, an order was received to stop these preparations and to secure the area around Iyang and Ninghsiang, west of the Hsiang Chiang.

The 11th Army ordered the 40th Division to advance to the district west of Hengyang in order to protect the Japanese troops from enemy attempts to break through from the outside of the pincer movement. By 27 July, the main force of this division was disposed at the Tungchientu and Tungyangtu crossings to check the enemy's advance. At this time the element of the 116th Division was ordered to return to its parent organization.

On the 18th, the 1st Field Replacement Unit advanced to the vicinity of Hsianghsiang in order to relieve the 58th Division of garrison duty in that area and also to prepare for an attack against Kushui. On the 26th, however, orders were received to suspend preparations for this attack and to secure Hsianghsiang, Hengshan and Isuho.

Hsiang Chiang Bank Sector: After the capture of Changsha, the 58th Division assumed the responsibility for securing Changsha and the upper Hsiang Chiang as well as the construction of roads in the area. With the arrival of the 64th Division and the 1st Field Replacement Unit at the end of June, however, garrison duty in the Hsiang Chiang area was divided as follows:

58th Division - Upper reaches of the Hsiang Chiang from Lukow lst Field Replacement Unit - Area between Ikiawan and Lukow (excluding Lukow)

64th Division - Lower reaches of the Hsiang Chiang from Ikiawan. (excluding Ikiawan)

By the latter part of July operational preparations had been completed and, on the 30th, the 11th Army ordered the attack. At the same time, the 11th Army commander moved his headquarters to the northwest of Hengyang where, from 2 August, he personally directed the offensive. He issued the following operational order:

On 3 and 4 August, the 5th Air Army will cooperate chiefly with the 68th Division and on 5 and 6 August with the 58th Division.

At 1700 on 4 August, the 68th Division will launch its attack. Its main force will capture the hills east of Yoping and a powerful element will capture School Hill. Thereafter it will im-

mediately pursue the enemy toward Tiehlumen wharf.

At 1700 on 4 August, the 116th Division will launch its attack.

After occupying Yoping hill, its main force will pursue the enemy toward the Bank of China.


The 58th Division will assemble secretly in a line close to the enemy positions. On 5 August, the entire main force from the northwest of Hengyang and elements from the north will open an attack and advance toward the Chunmen wharf.

On 4 August, by employing artillery and guerrilla units, the 13th Division will support the 68th Division's offensive operation. On the 5th, artillery fire will be concentrated on the Suhsian wharf area. On the night of the 5th, two infantry battalions, under the command of the regimental commander, will cross the river in order to cooperate with the 58th Division's attack.

On 4 August, the 68th and 116th Divisions launched their attacks according to plan but with little success. On the 5th, they made some progress, but the situation was still unsatisfactory. On the 6th, they concentrated their strength in Yoping and continued their attack. Although the 116th Division succeeded in capturing part of the enemy's front line, the 68th Division was unable to make any headway.

The 58th Division opened its attack from the area north and north-west of Hengyang and, on the 6th, was the first to enter Hengyang, capturing the northwestern portion of the Walled City and the Hsiaohsimen Gate area. (Map 14)

Although, at first, the 13th Division had been ordered immediately after crossing the river to attack the enemy strong points along



the river bank, this order had to be rescinded due chiefly to the shortage of mountain gun shells, and the Division was then or ered to divert the enemy in this area.

On the morning of 7 August, the 11th Army reopened its offensive along the entire front but made no progress. It, therefore, estimated that it would require several more days to capture Hengyang. In the evening, however, a small enemy unit capitulated in front of the 68th Division. The Army at once ordered the entire front to intensify its attack and during the night Japanese troops penetrated the enemy front lines and invaded part of the Walled City. From midnight enemy troops gradually surrendered and, before daybreak on the 8th, Fang Hsien-Chuen (10th Army commander) and four division commanders had surrendered. By 0800, having destroyed an enemy element which resisted to the last, the 11th Army occupied Hengyang.

Japanese casualties from start of operation until 20 July were:

	<u>Personnel</u>	Horses
Killed	3,860	7,120 (including those which died from
Wounded	8,327	sickness.)
Sick	7,099	
Total	19,286	7,120
Percentage	15.1%	17.2%

Casualties from enemy air raids were approximately 10% of

strength.2

There is no record of losses after 20 July.

Diversionary Operation by 13th Army


In order to facilitate the Peiping-Hankou Operation being carried out by the North China Area Army, the 13th Army dispatched the 65th Division from Chengyangkuan with orders to carry out a feint attack in the Fouyang area until 8 May. To facilitate the Human-Kwangsi Operation, it advanced the 70th Division toward Lungyu and ordered it to carry out feint operation along the Chekiang-Kiangsi railway (Map 15). On 8 June, this division (composed basically of six infantry battalions) assembled in the district southwest of Chinhua.

On 9 June, an element of the 70th Division advanced south of Lungyu to cut off the enemy's retreat route to the west, while on the 10th, the main force (four infantry battalions) defeated the Chinese 26th Division near Tangchi. It continued to pursue the enemy and, on the 12th, captured Lungyu.

In an effort to divert the main force of the Chinese 3d War Sector Army, on the 16th, the 13th Army ordered the 70th Division to attack Chuhsien. It was then to mop up the remaining enemy in the area within five days and, at the same time, prepare to advance to Yushan.

Three enemy divisions were located near Chuhsien and it was estimated that another division was disposed about 16 kilometers northwest of Chuhsien, near Changshan.

^{2.} These figures were obtained from telegrams and reports on the progress on the operation in the files of the 1st Demobilization Bureau.



on 16 June, the 70th Division left Lungyu and, despite persistent enemy attacks, advanced toward Chuhsien. On the 21st, the enemy counterattacked from the vicinity of Tachouchen but was defeated. The 70th Division then assembled its main force about six kilometers southeast of Chuhsien where it prepared for the final attack on Chuhsien. On the 22d, although threatened by five enemy divisions the 70th Division took the initiative and routed the enemy. Although the Chinese appeared to be rallying their forces to counterattack, the Division captured Chuhsien on the 26th.

As the 11th Army had occupied Changsha on 18 June and Hengyang airfield on the 26th, the 13th Army, in general, achieved the objective of the diversionary operation and, at the same time, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.

The 13th Army then ordered the withdrawal of the 70th Division from Chuhsien. On the evening of 28 June, the Division commenced its withdrawal and, by 2 July, had assembled in the vicinity of Chinhua and Lanchi.

Japanese casualties during this operation were: 170 men killed and 555 wounded, also 37 horses killed and 20 wounded.³

^{3.} Information in regard to the 13th Army's diversionary operation was obtained from telegrams in the files of the 1st Demobilization Bureau.

Defense of Rear Occupied Areas

After the Peiping-Hankou Operation and the capture of Changsha, the China Expeditionary Army published the boundaries of the occupational sectors in the Wuchang-Hankou area and the Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army, under the command of the 11th Army commander, was ordered to guard this area. By late June, the Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army disposed its garrison forces as follows: (Map 16)

Hsianghsi Sector4	39th Division (with 5th Independent Infantry Brigade attached)		
Yingshan-Hsinyang Sector	11th Independent Infantry Brigade		
Nanchang Sector	7th Independent Infantry Brigade		
Yoyang-Changlochieh Sector	17th Independent Mixed Brigade		
Hsienning Sector	12th Independent Infantry Brigade		
Hankou Sector	5th Field Replacement Unit		
Hsiaochihkou Sector	9th Field Replacement Unit		
Yingcheng Sector	10th Field Replacement Unit		

Strengthening of Command System

The Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army had been organized temporarily by the China Expeditionary Army to guard the Wuchang-Hankou area. In mid-July Imperial General Headquarters redesignated it as the 34th

^{4.} As the Han Chiang was also known as the Hsiang Chiang and "hsi" means west in Chinese and Japanese, west of Han Chiang was known as the Hsianghsi Sector.

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Army. Its organization, disposition and mission were the same as that of the Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army.

After the second phase of the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation, Imperial General Headquarters considered it necessary to establish an area army to command the 11th, 23d and 34th Armies as well as the army groups in the area between the 11th and 34th Armies' areas of responsibility. In the latter part of August, therefore, it ordered the organization of the Sixth Area Army and placed it under the command of the China Expeditionary Army commander. Organization of the Area Army was completed on 10 September as follows:

Order of Battle of the Sixth Area Army:

Commander - Gen Yasutsugu Okamura

Sixth Area Army Headquarters

11th Army

23d Army

34th Army

27th Division

40th Division

64th Division

68th Division

25th Anti-aircraft Regiment

38th Independent Engineer Regiment

60th Independent Engineer Battalion

6th Division's Bridge Construction Company
7th Division's Bridge Construction Company
2d Field Railway Unit of the China Expeditionary

5 railway regiments

Army

- 2 railway bridge construction battalions
- 2 railway engineer battalions
- 3 railway engineer units
- 1 railway material depot
- 2 railway station headquarters
- 1 land duty unit

5th Communication Regiment

58th and 59th Fixed Radio Communication Units

Line of Communication Units Directly Attached to the Sixth Area Army:

- l line of communication headquarters
- 3 line of communication guard units
- 1 field transport headquarters
- 3 motor transport regiments
- 2 independent motor transport battalions
- 5 independent motor transport companies
- 1 road construction unit
- 1 field duty unit headquarters
- 1 land duty unit

- 4 water duty units
- 2 construction duty units
- l section of field reserve hospital
- 3 line of communitation hospitals
- 2 casualty clearing platoons
- 1 casualty clearing section
- 1 field ordnance depot
- 1 field motor transport depot
- l field freight depot
- 2 field replacement units


In addition, an army headquarters was required in order to place the various army groups disposed from Changsha to Hengyang under a single command. This would facilitate the advance of the 11th Army and preparations for its subsequent operations. In late September, therefore, Imperial General Headquarters issued orders transferring the 20th Army Headquarters from Manchuria and, in mid-October, the 20th Army Headquarters arrived in the Wuchang-Hankou sector. Imperial General Headquarters then ordered the 27th, 64th, 68th and 116th Divisions together with other units to the rear of the 11th Army organized into the 20th Army and placed this army under the command of the Sixth Area Army.

After the Peiping-Hankou Operation, the 12th Army in north China, with its headquarters at Chenghsien, was made responsible for the security of the newly captured areas as well as its former operational

sector, with Licheng as its center. Since it was more convenient, however, to place the Licheng area under the direct command of the North China Area Army, on 1 September, Imperial General Headquarters withdrew the 59th Division (Licheng), the 5th Independent Mixed Brigade (Chingtao) and the 1st Independent Infantry Brigade (Tzuyang) from the order of battle of the 12th Army and placed them under the direct command of the North China Area Army.

In March 1945, the 43d Army was activated in Shantung Province.⁵

^{5.} Information in regard to the establishment of the new headquarters was obtained from notes kept by former Lt Col Ishiwari.



Chapter 4

Operation Along the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway, west of Hengyang (Map 18)

Operational Preparations

The operational plan which the China Expeditionary Army ordered the Sixth Area Army to carry out was as follows:

After the capture of Hengyang, the 11th Army will concentrate its combat strength and accumulate the necessary war materiel for its subsequent operations. The 37th Division will be transferred from north China as reinforcements to the Army and other units will gradually be assigned garrison duty in the already occupied areas.

In mid-September, the Sixth Area Army will launch an attack on the Kweilin and Liuchowhsien sectors. Six divisions of the 11th Army will advance along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway toward Kweilin. At the same time, two divisions and one mixed brigade of the 23d Army will advance west along the Hsi Chiang, while another brigade of the 23d Army will march north from Haikang and capture Liuchowhsien.

If circumstances demand, Nanning will then be captured.

The 11th Army will use waterways and rail-roads as primary lines of communication. The 23d Army will use the Hsi Chiang. After the capture of Kweilin and Liuchowhsien, supplies for these areas will be transported chiefly from the 23d Army area.


Upon completion of this operation the 104th Division and the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade of the 23d Army will return to their original stations while the 22d Division and the 22d Independent Mixed Brigade will be attached to the 11th Army.

In preparation for this operation, the 11th Army will regroup its troops as follows: 64th Division in the Changsha area, the 2d Replacement Unit in the Liuyang sector, the 1st Replacement Unit in the Youngfeng-Isuho-Hengshan sector and the Iwamoto Detachment (to arrive at Hsinshih on 7 August) in the Liling-Pinghsiang area. The 27th Division will be sent from Liling to the Leiyang-Chaling area.

The 3d Division will be dispatched to the sector on the left wing of the front line. In view of the anticipated delay in the 27th Division's arrival in the Leiyang sector, the 216th Infantry Regiment will guard this area until the arrival of the 27th Division. The 37th Division (scheduled to arrive in this theater mid-August) will assemble at Youngfeng.

Following the westward advance of the Army's main force, the 68th and 34th Divisions will be disposed to the rear of the Army. The 109th Infantry Regiment of the 116th Division and two infantry battalions from the 40th Division (both of which are garrisoning strategic points in the Iyang area under the command of the 64th Division) will be returned to their parent organizations.

Prior to the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation, the main force of the 23d Army carried out a feint attack in the area northeast of Canton while elements were ordered to occupy designated bases from which to launch the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation. From the latter part of June the 22d Division took the offensive against the enemy located to the northeast of Canton. The 8th Independent Infantry Brigade attacked the Tsunghua sector while the 104th Division crossed the Hsi Chiang and raided the district to the west of Chingyuan. All designated bases for the operation were captured and the 22d Independent Mixed Brigade



secured Taishan and the district to the northwest.

With this feint attack and the securing of the required bases, by the end of August, the 23d Army had completed its various preparations.

In order to launch the operation, on 23 August the 23d Army issued the following orders for the disposition of its troops:

The 104th Division will concentrate in the Taipingshih-Sankenghsu sector. On 6 September, the Kawakami Raiding Unit (three infantry battalions commanded by Colonel Kawakami) will leave Chukeng and, on the 9th, will advance to the Tafantung sector.

On 7 September, the main force of the 22d Division will complete its assembly in the Chiangmen-Hsinhui sector while an element will assemble at Chiuchiang.

On 6 September, the 22d Independent Mixed Brigade will complete its concentration in the northern Hsinchang sector.

On 8 September, the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade will prepare to leave the district north of Suichi.


Following this, the 23d Army ordered the following units to advance to Wuchow: the 104th Division along the northern bank of the Hsi Chiang, the 22d Division along the southern bank of the same river and the 22d Independent Mixed Brigade through the district south of the 22d Division's route. The 23d Independent Mixed Brigade, which was stationed on the Liuchow Peninsula, was ordered to advance north to Finnan.

Progress of 11th Army's Operation until Capture of Chuanhsien (Map 19)

After the capture of Hengyang the 11th Army, in an attempt to annihilate the enemy gathered in the district west of Hengyang, deployed its troops from Youngfeng to the Chun Shui, west of Leiyang. From the north the 37th, 116th and 40th Divisions, the Ota Detachment, and the 58th, 13th and 3d Divisions were deployed in parallel lines. On 29 August they opened their attack and, about 1 September, the enemy began to retreat. The Chinese 74th and 100th Armies, faced by the Japanese 37th and 116th Divisions, retreated to east of Shaoyang; their 46th, 62d and 79th Armies in the Hunan-Kwangsi railway sector retreated to the Kiyang sector and their 26th and 37th Armies, to the front of the Japanese 3d Division, retreated to the southwest. The 11th Army pursued the enemy to the east of Shaoyang and Kiyang. On 5 September Japanese forces captured Kiyang and Hwochangping. On the 6th, they occupied Lingling airfield. The enemy continued to occupy Changning as the 3d Division, which was to have advanced in that direction, was diverted and ordered to attack Kiyang; later the 34th Division occupied Changning.

On 4 September, the rear echelons of the 37th Division finally reached Youngfeng.

The 11th Army continued to pursue the enemy along the north-south line through Tunganshih. On 8 September, the 58th Division captured Tunganshih while the 3d Division captured Lingling. In order to take



advantage of the favorable situation and also to obtain bases from which to launch an attack against Chuanhsien, the Army issued orders to pursue the enemy toward the Chuanchiatien-Huangshaho-Yungankuan line. By the 9th, Japanese forces had advanced to the boundary between Hunan and Kwangsi Provinces, north of Chuanhsien and without waiting to regroup captured Chuanhsien on the 14th.

On 10 September, the Sixth Area Army was activated and, in early October, established its command post at Nanyuehshih.

Operation Prior to Occupation of Kweilin-Liuchowhsien (Map 20)


After the capture of Chuanhsien, in order to prepare for operations at the Chuanhsien-Taohsien line, the 11th Army ordered its units to be disposed as follows: elements of the 40th Division were ordered to secure Tunganshih and Hsinning while its main force was ordered to concentrate in the area south of Hsinning; an element of the 58th Division was ordered to occupy the Paitang-Maimatsun line, while the main force of the division was to concentrate in the district to the rear of this line; an element of the 13th Division was to hold the Tachiao-Shihtanghsu line, with the division's main force concentrating to the rear, while an element of the 3d Division was to occupy Yungankuan and the Kianghwa-Yungming line with its main force concentrated in the Taohsien area. All troops were in position by 21 September.

On 1 October, the 58th Division occupied Hsinganshih.

As the enemy's main force in the Shaoyang sector appeared to be withdrawing to the district along the left bank of the Tzu Chiang, on 19 September the Army ordered the 37th Division to occupy Shaoyang and, at the same time, ordered the 116th Division to cooperate with the 37th Division in this operation. On 28 September, Shaoyang was occupied.

In the offensive operation west of Hengyang, the Army had advanced its troops westward without attacking Changning. On 15 September the Army ordered the main force of the Ota Detachment (at Lingling) and the 34th Division (at Anjen) to attack Changning from the west and east respectively. On the 18th, an element of the Ota Detachment arrived in the Changning area. The 34th Division left Leivang on the 20th but was delayed en route in crossing the Chun Shui and did not arrive in the vicinity of Changning until 29 September. Immediately upon the arrival of the 34th Division, both units attacked as directed and, on 1 October, captured the town.

After the occupation of Shaoyang and Changning, the 37th and 34th Divisions were ordered to advance to the front line and the security of the strategic areas to the rear east of the boundary between Hunan and Kwangsi Provinces was assigned to the 68th and 116th Divisions under the direct command of the Sixth Area Army. The 68th Division garrisoned Changning, Paishui, Kiyang, Lingling, Tunganshih, Hengyang and Sungpai as well as the area along the Hunan-Kwangsi rail-



way, while the 116th Division garrisoned Youngfeng, Hungchiaoshih and the area to the northwest.

In order to capture Kweilin, on 20 October the 11th Army ordered its troops disposed as follows:

The 216th Infantry Regiment (composed mainly of four infantry battalions and one artillery battalion) was to advance to the gorge west of Lukou by 2 November and there to prepare to attack the district southwest of Kweilin. The 58th Division was to prepare to attack the district north of Kweilin. The 40th Division was to leave its concentration base on 23 October and to advance from the Hsinganshih area along the right bank of the Hsiang Chiang to the Kaotienhsu district by the 31st, where it was to complete preparations for an attack on the district east of Kweilin.

By 31 October, the 13th Division was to have advanced through Kwanyang and Huangniuchai to Kueiyuehtsun and to there complete its final preparations for an attack against the district south of Kweilin. By 29 October, the 37th Division was to advance to the district between Taohsien and Yungming and to prepare to launch an attack on Kweilin through the Lunghukuan-Kungcheng sector.

By 28 October, the 3d Division was to advance to the Kianghwa-Fuchwan sector where it was to prepare for an operation against Pinglo.

Elements of the 34th Division were to be sent to Chuanhsien, Yungankuan, Kwanyang and Hsinganshih as soon as possible, while the main force of the division was to arrive at Chuanhsien by 30 October.


On 28 October, the 11th Army ordered the 3d Division to leave the district along the Fuchwan-Chungshan road and to occupy Pinglo and Lipuhsien and there prepare for an operation against the Liuchow-hsien and Kweilin areas. The 37th Division was ordered to leave the district along the Lunghukuan-Kungcheng-Yangsa road and to occupy Kungcheng and Yangsa on 29 October. There it was to prepare for the operation against Kweilin.

The troops advanced as ordered with very little opposition from the Chinese.

As the enemy garrison at Liuchowhsien was weak, on 3 November the 11th Army, in order that it might take advantage of the situation, ordered the 3d and 13th Divisions to capture Liuchowhsien.

Progress of 23d Army's Operations (Map 21)

In the meantime, between 6 and 9 September, the 23d Army completed the concentration of its troops for the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation as follows: the 104th Division at Taipingshih, the 22d Division in the Chiangmen-Hsinhui sector, the 22d Independent Mixed Brigade at Hsinchang and the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade in the north-eastern sector of Luichow Peninsula. On the 6th, the Kawakami Raiding Unit (104th Division) began to advance along the Chukeng-Huaichi-Wuchow road and, on the 8th, the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade commenced its movement from Matouling Hill, 12 km north of Suichi.



On 13 September, the main force of the 104th Division moved along the Ssuhui-Kaoyao-Wuchow road on the north bank of the Hsi Chiang while the 22d Division advanced along the Chiuchiang-Yunfou-Yunan road south of the Hsi Chiang paralleled by the 22d Independent Mixed Brigade on the Hsinchang-Hsinhsing-Wuchow road.

While these units moved west, the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade advanced north along the Suichi-Junghsien-Tanchuhsu road.

On 22 September, the Kawakami Raiding Unit captured Wuchow and, on the 28th, Tanchuhsu airfield. After the capture of Wuchow, the 22d Independent Mixed Brigade was held responsible for the security of ammunition trains along the Hsi Chiang. On 12 September, a naval unit, supported by a navy air unit, began sweeping and clearing the Hsi Chiang to open this waterway for traffic. Despite some interference from the enemy, the work progressed as planned.

Each Army unit steadily continued its advance westward and, on 11 October, the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade captured Kueiping.

On 22 October, the 23d Army planned to destroy the enemy at Kuei-hsien and, at the same time, to advance to the area between Tahuang-chiangkou and Sanchianghsu north and west of the Hsi Chiang in order to prepare for an operation against the sector west of Liuchowhsien. The 104th and 22d Divisions were ordered to advance by the end of October to the Tahuangchiangkou-Sanchianghsu and Kueiping-Paishahsu-Shihlunghsu sectors respectively. A detachment of the 22d Division


was placed under the command of the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade and the Brigade was ordered to attack the enemy near Kueihsien. All units began to advance as ordered. From 24 October, however, about four divisions of the Chinese 46th and 64th Armies, supported by a large number of planes, daily attacked Kueiping. The 22d Division, together with an element of the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade, counterattacked from the sector west of Kueiping and although the enemy was reinforced by an additional two divisions, on 29 October they began to retreat toward Wushuan and Laipin. On 3 November, the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade captured Kueihsien, and, on the 4th, the 104th Division occupied Wushuan.

On 7 November, in order to pursue and destroy the defeated enemy, the 23d Army, in cooperation with the 11th Army, issued the following order:

The 104th Division will pursue the enemy along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway toward Liuchow-hsien and destroy them in the area southwest of Liuchowhsien.

The 22d Division will advance an element (about one infantry regiment) to the Liushanhsu sector to cut the enemy's retreat route. The main force of the Division will pursue the enemy toward the district southwest of Liuchenghsien and, in cooperation with an element of the 11th Army, will destroy the enemy in the sector west of Liuchowhsien.

The 23d Independent Mixed Brigade will advance toward Laipin, at the same time covering the rear and left flank of the 23d Army.



Capture of Kweilin and Liuchowhsien and Fursuit Operation (Map 22)

The 11th Army ordered the 58th, 40th and 37th Divisions and the 216th Infantry Regiment to attack Kweilin from the north, east, south and southwest respectively by the end of October. The 13th and 3d Divisions were ordered to attack Liuchowhsien from the north and south of the Hunan-Kwangsi railroad.

In early November, each Army group opened its attack. The troops attacking Kweilin city steadily closed their pincers and, in the early morning of 9 November, in cooperation with the 5th Air Army, commenced the final attack on the city.

The 13th Division starting from Kueiyuehtsun and advancing westward, on 6 November, arrived at Chungtu. It then continued its advance to the south.

On 6 November, the 3d Division captured Hsiujenhsien and, on the 8th, Lojunghsien and Faishahsu.

On 7 November, the 23d Army ordered its forces to commence the operation against Liuchowhsien. The main body of the 104th Division advanced to the area west of Liuchowhsien while an element advanced directly to Liuchowhsien. The 22d Division, however, was delayed in crossing the Hsun Chiang (lower reaches of the Yu Chiang).

On the 9th, the Sixth Area Army ordered the 11th Army to dispatch all available strength to Ishan immediately and, at the same time, to transfer those troops participating in the attack on Liuchowhsien to the 23d Army temporarily. The 23d Army was ordered to

advance its main force to the district west of Liuchowhsien where, in cooperation with the 11th Army troops, it was to attack the enemy's main force and capture Liuchowhsien city.

In accordance with Sixth Area Army orders, the 3d Division and elements of the 13th Division were attached to the 23d Army.

On the 9th, an element of the 104th Division occupied Liuchowhsien airfield and, on the 10th, an element of the 13th Division occupied the city.

The main force of the 104th Division successfully pushed back the enemy to the northwest of Liuchowhsien. On the 13th, the Division arrived at Liushanhsu and, on the 15th, penetrated Hsincheng.

Also on the 13th, an advance unit of the 22d Division reached Changtung while the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade assembled at Tanchiang.

In the meantime, on 10 November, assisted by the 5th Air Army, the 11th Army captured Kweilin.

In order to destroy the enemy retreating northwest through the district south of Ishan, on 13 November, the 11th Army ordered the 13th Division to continue its pursuit toward the Nantan-Hochih sector. The Division successfully cut the Chinese retreat route and destroyed the enemy in this area. At the same time, the 3d Division, pursuing the enemy westward through the district west of Liuchowhsien, advanced to Ishan and the area northwest of Ishan. The 3d and 13th

Divisions then checked and destroyed the enemy in the areas around Ishan. Hwaiyuanchen and Peiyahsu.

The 3d Division driving north, crossed the line of advance of the 13th Division. It captured Ipehhsien on 27 November and Pache on 2 December. On 28 November, the 13th Division captured Nantan and, on 2 December, occupied Tuhshan.

On 4 December, in accordance with Army orders, these groups returned to their previous stations in order to garrison these areas.

On 15 November, the Sixth Area Army ordered the 23d Army to destroy the enemy in the Hsincheng-Ishan sector and to capture Nanning. Accordingly, the 23d Army ordered the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade to capture Nanning. The main force of the 22d Division was ordered to advance rapidly toward Nanning while an element of the division was to occupy Pinyang.


On the 17th, the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade crossed the Hung-shui Ho, west of Laipin. On the 20th, it reached Pinyang and, on the 24th, captured Nanning. The 22d Division then advanced from Changtung, securing Pinyang, Nanning and Wuming.

Previously the Southern Army had ordered the Indo-China Garrison Army to prepare to penetrate into the interior of China from French Indo-China. The Ichinomiya Detachment (composed mainly of four infantry battalions and one artillery battalion), which was to be placed under the command of the Sixth Area Army upon its arrival in Kwangsi

Province, was ordered to advance to Nanning after the 23d Army had occupied Nanning. Accordingly, on 28 November the Ichinomiya Detachment left the border line and, on 10 December, arrived at Suilu where it joined an element of the 22d Division which had been dispatched previously from Nanning to the border. A line through Suilu marked the boundary of the sectors for which these units became responsible.

After having destroyed the enemy air bases and annihilated the main force of the enemy in the Kweilin-Liuchowhsien sector, the Sixth Area Army attached the 22d Division and the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade to the 11th Army in order to secure the strategic points in this district. At the same time, it ordered the 11th Army to maintain the security of the strategic areas along the high road from Chuanhsien to Nanning, along the Hsi Chiang west of Wuchow and along the Kweichow-Kwangsi railway to Hwaiyuanchen. Further, it ordered the 23d Army to return the 104th Division to Canton and the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade to the Luichow Peninsula where these units were to assume their former duties and accelerate their preparations for an attack against the United States forces.

The disposition of the forces of the Sixth Area Army in mid-December 1944 are shown on Map 23.



Operation to Control the area along the Canton-Hankou Railway and the Suichuan-Kanhsien Operation

Situation Prior to the Operation

During the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation the defeated Chinese 9th War Sector Army retreated to the area south of Leiyang and Lienhwa. The enemy's main force was assembled in the areas around Chenhsien, Yunghsing, Jucheng and Kweitung while elements were disposed around Kweiyang, Changning, Leiyang and Chaling. In order to guard against the Japanese advance southward, the 9th War Sector Army disposed its best trained and equipped units at Leiyang. The enemy's strength was estimated at four armies (12 divisions) and it was estimated that reinforcements, which would boost its strength to approximately 20 divisions, would be sent from other areas.

As the strength of the 7th War Sector Army in eastern Kwangtung Province was only two armies (63d and 65th Armies) or five divisions it seemed unlikely that reinforcements would be sent to Shaochow from this area.

It was estimated that the enemy air force would use the remaining air bases east of and at Chihkiang if the Japanese forces attacked the Suichuan-Kanhsien area.

At this time, the Canton-Hankou railway was in operation only between Shaochow and Chenhsien. There were many tunnels and bridges along this line where it ran across the Tasouling Mountain Range. (There were 13 large steel bridges and 15 long tunnels from Lokchong to Chenhsien.) If these tunnels and bridges were destroyed by the enemy it would not only take a long time to repair them but would also require vast quantities of materials. In order to successfully carry out the operation along the Canton-Hankou railway, therefore, it was essential that this area be occupied before the enemy destroyed these structures, particularly those between Paishihtu, Pingshek and Chimen.

Further, there were many bridges and tunnels on the railway from Yuantanhsu to Yingte south of Shaochow and it was considered most important that these should be protected from damage.

In late September the Japanese 20th Army headquarters was transferred from Manchuria to central China. On 27 September, Imperial
General Headquarters issued the order of battle of the 20th Army,
placed the 27th, 64th, 68th and 116th Divisions and the 1st and 2d
Field Replacement Units and others under its command, and assigned
it the mission of garrisoning the Hunan Province south of the Ku Shul.
At the end of October the Army headquarters arrived at Hengyang and,
on 8 November, the Army took over its assigned mission.

The Iwamoto Detachment and the 40th Division were placed under the command of the 20th Army on 8 and 10 November respectively. The Iwamoto Detachment was attached to the 27th Division and assigned garrison duty in the Division's sector during the time the Division was engaged in the Canton-Hankou Railway Operation. The 40th Division assembled in the Tachsien-Lingling sector within the 68th Division's operational sector.

After the completion of the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation, the 23d Army had returned the 104th Division and the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade to their former stations. On the way back, however, the 104th Division was ordered to assemble near Chingyuan in order to participate in the Canton-Hankou Railway Operation. The 8th Independent Infantry Brigade, under the command of the 23d Army was charged with garrisoning Canton and the lower reaches of the Hsi Chiang. 1

Command of Operation

In mid-January 1945, the Eixth Area Army commander began to make plans to control the area along the southern Canton-Hankou railway and occupy the enemy air bases in the Suichuan-Kanhsien area. The strength to be employed for this operation was the 27th and 40th Divisions and the 57th Infantry Brigade (68th Division) from the 20th Army, five battalions of the 104th Division and the 8th Independent Infantry Brigade from the 23d Army, and an element of the 5th Air Army.

The boundary between the 20th and 23d Armies was defined as a line running east and west through Shaochow with Shaochow being in-

^{1.} Information in regard to the situation prior to this operation was supplied from memory by Major Sentaro Azuma, a former Sixth Area Army staff officer.

cluded in the 20th Army's zone of responsibility.

20th Army's Operational Plan

Objective of Operation

The main force of the 20th Army, in cooperation with the 23d Army and the 5th Air Army, will occupy and reopen the Canton-Hankou railway from Shacehow to Leiyang. An element of the 20th Army will capture and secure the enemy air bases in the area south of the Suichuan-Kanhsien district.

Operational Plan

Prior to the advance of the main force, the Army will dispatch powerful raiding units. Their primary mission will be the protection of bridges and tunnels between Lokchong and Chenhsien and their secondary mission the annihilation of the enemy field forces.

At the beginning of January 1945, the raiding units will commence their actions while about 20 January the other army groups will open their attacks.

The operational period is estimated to be two months.

Raiding Operation along the southern Canton-Hankou Railway

About 20 December 1944, the Army will assemble the main force of the 40th Division in the Taoshien area and an element of the Division (one infantry regiment) in the Lingling area. About 10 January 1945, the 57th Infantry Brigade will concentrate around Leiyang and will cooperate with the 40th Division. All operational preparations will be carried out in secret.

From the beginning of January, three raiding units (A, C, and D each composed of approximately one infantry battalion) will be dispatched successively from the Taohsien area and will advance along the provincial boundary toward the area between lokchong and Paishihtu. At the same time B Raiding Unit will leave Lingling and advance toward the sector between Paishihtu and Chenhsien. On the morning of 19 January all raiding units will raid and occupy all railway bridges and tunnels between Lokchong and Chenhsien.

On the night of 18 January, the main force of the 40th Division will leave Tachsien and the district south of Lingling and advance as quickly as possible to the Pingshek-Liangtien sector where it will expand the raiding units' gains. An element will remain to secure the Canton-Hankou railway between Chenhsien and Lokchong. The main force of the division will proceed toward Shaochow where, in cooperation with the 23d Army, it will attack the enemy. It will then occupy the railway between Shaochow and Lokchong.

On the night of 18 January, the 57th Infantry Brigade will leave Leiyang. An unit (composed mainly of one infantry battalion and two artillery companies) will move from the Canton-Hankou railway area while the main force (three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion) will advance from the right bank of the Lei Chiang. The Brigade will advance to Chenhsien in order to occupy the Canton-Hankou railway between Leiyang and Chenhsien.

After the capture of the Chenhsien area, the main force of the Brigade will advance to the Santushih area to capture the Santushih branch line and the coal mine located there.

When the main force of the 40th Division advances to the Shaochow area, an element of the Brigade will take over the garrison duty of the Canton-Hankou railway between Chenhsien and Paishihtu. The Brigade will be responsible for the

security and repair of the railways and coal mines north of the provincial boundary and south of Lei-yang.

About 18 January, the 68th Division will dispatch an element from the area south of Lingling and Changning to facilitate the operations of the 40th Division and the 57th Infantry Brigade.

Operation to capture enemy air bases in the Tayu-Suichuan-Kanhsien District

About 10 January, the 27th Division will assemble in the Chaling-Lienhwa sector and, about 20 January, will commence its operation to capture Suichuan, Kanhsien, Hsincheng and Tayu airfields. The 40th Division will advance from Shaochow and capture the Nanhsiung airfield. The Army will then secure these airfields, with the exception of Suichuan, which will be destroyed.

The 27th Division will concentrate the Sakuraba Unit (two infantry battalions) in the Chaling area and its main force in the area west of Lienhwa. In order to capture the Suichuan airfield, the main force of the division will advance along the Lienhwa-Yunghsin-Suichuan road while the Sakuraba Unit will advance along the Chaling-Ninghsien-Suichuan road. After its capture, an element of the division will remain to destroy the airfield. The main force will advance immediately and occupy the airfields in the Kanhsien area. In cooperation with the 40th Division, the 27th Division will capture the Hsincheng and Tayu airfields. The strength of the 27th Division will then be disposed between Kanhsien and Shaochow in order to secure the air bases in the Kanhsien-Tayu sector.

After the occupation of the Canton-Hankou railway, an element (one infantry regiment) of the 40th Division will be disposed along the railway and be responsible for its security. The main force of the Division, in cooperation with the 27th Division, will advance and capture the Nambhaiung airfield.

Following the concentration of the 27th Division, the main force of the 40th Division will assemble at Shaochow or Nanhsiung and there prepare for its advance to Canton.

The 5th Air Army will commence its activity on 19 January. It will support the raiding units by protecting their lines of communication and supply and, when necessary, will cooperate with the 40th Division and the 57th Infantry Brigade.²

23d Army's Operational Plan

About mid-January, the 23d Army will open its operation to occupy the railways in its operational sector as quickly as possible. The main force of the 104th Division will advance via Fokang and occupy the sector between Yingte and Shaochow (including Shaochow) while an element will advance north from Yuantanhsu and occupy the railway south of Yingte. The 8th Independent Infantry Brigade will advance north and guard the Canton-Hankou railway south of Shaochow (excluding Shaochow). The 104th Division will then advance to the Haifeng-Lufeng area to prepare for the operation against the United States Army forces.3

Progress of Operation (Map 24)

Prior to the operation members of the four raiding units of the 40th Division had received special training in the Chinese language and in tactics for capturing small areas. On 3 January, A Raiding

^{2.} The 20th Army's operational plan was reconstructed from material recorded from memory by staff officers of the 20th Army after the termination of World War II.

^{3.} The 23d Army's operational plan was reconstructed from information supplied from memory by Major Sentaro Azuma, a former Sixth Area Army staff officer.


Unit moved out from Taohsien to be followed, on the 7th, by C and D. On the 12th, B Raiding Unit moved out of Lingling.

Between 19 and 22 January they raided and occupied the areas around Lokchong, Chimen, Pingshek, Paishihtu and Liangtien without damage to tunnels or bridges. D Raiding Unit continued to advance and, on 26 January, occupied Shaochow.

On 18 January, the main force of the Division left its assembly area and, on the 24th, arrived at Pingshek. After exploiting the success of the raiding units in this area, on the 26th, it began its advance to Nanhsiung. On 3 February, the main force of the Division and C Raiding Unit together occupied Nanhsiung. On the 5th, the main force of the Division occupied Tayu and, on the 7th, Hsincheng where it met the 27th Division coming from the north.

On 18 January, the 57th Infantry Brigade left Leiyang in two columns and, on the 25th, it occupied Chenhsien. Then, in accordance with Army orders, it advanced toward Santushih, capturing Tungkiang on 1 February and Santushih on the 7th.

The 27th Division dispatched the Sakuraba Unit (two infantry battalions) along the Chaling-Ninghsien-Suichuan road while the main force of the division advanced along the Lienhwa-Yunghsin-Suichuan road. As the Sakuraba Unit was stopped north of Ninghsien by the difficult terrain and a strong enemy force, the Division commander ordered the Unit to turn east and join the Division at Yunghsin.



The main force occupied Yunghsin and Suichuan airfields on 23 and 28 January respectively. An element remained at Suichuan airfield in order to demolish it completely. The main force continued its advance and, on 4 February, occupied the Kanhsien airfield. On the 8th, it advanced to Hsincheng where it joined the 40th Division which had already arrived there.

The 23d Army had concentrated the main force of the 104th Division near Chingyuan. On 18 January, this division began to move and, by the 24th, had occupied both Yingte and Shaochow. After the return of the 104th Division to Canton area about 8 February the Canton-Hankou railway, south of Shaochow, was guarded by the 8th Independent Infantry Brigade.

By 26 January, the entire line of the Canton-Hankou railway had been captured and, by 8 February, all airfields in the Suichuan-Kanhsien sector had been occupied.

Occupation

The Sixth Area Army defined the boundary between the 20th and 23d Armies' zones of responsibility as a line from Suichuan along the provincial boundary between Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces and the provincial boundary between Hunan and Kwangtung Provinces, with the 23d Army responsible for the area along the boundary line. At this time, the 27th and 40th Divisions were placed under the command of the 23d Army. In order to garrison the occupied areas the 23d Army


disposed its forces as follows:

27th Division - the area between Kanhsien and Shaochow

8th Independent Infantry Brigade - the area along the Canton-Hankou railway from the Hunan-Kwangtung provincial boundary to Shakowyu.


40th Division - the area along the Canton-Hankou railway south of Shakowyu.

The 20th Army ordered the 68th Division to garrison the Canton-Hankou railway from Hengyang to the provincial boundary. (Map 25)



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GENERAL REFERENCE MAP - CHAPTER 5 MAP NO. 26



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Chapter 5

Operations to Destroy Airfields in Central and South China

Situation Prior to Lachokou Operation

During the Hunan-Kwangsi and Suichuan-Kanhsien operations enemy air bases in southwestern China had been wiped out. However, strong enemy air forces based in Chinkiang in central China and Læhokou in northern China continued to harass the Japanese forces and to strike at such transport arteries of the China Expeditionary Army as the railroad lines and motor highways in north and central China and the Yangtze River and the Hsiang Chiang in central China. Further, the enemy was receiving large air shipments of munitions and personnel and there were very definite indications that they planned to launch a major counteroffensive.

While in November 1944 the enemy air force had comprised approximately 800 planes, by March or April 1945 the number had increased to between 1500 to 2000 against the Japanese meager 150. Due to heavy plane losses in the Philippines and Okinawan campaigns it was not possible to replenish the planes of the Japanese forces in the China Theater. Consequently, the activities of the Japanese Air Force in China were limited to the training of personnel and to taking steps to safeguard the small number of planes remaining.


Foreseeing the impossibility of replenishing anticipated plane losses during 1945, in an effort to check the enemy air force, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the China Expeditionary Army to

destroy the enemy airfields in the Laohokou and Chihkiang sectors. In January 1945, therefore, the Expeditionary Army ordered the North China Area Army and the Sixth Area Army to launch offensives against the airfields in the Laohokou and Chihkiang sectors respectively. At the same time, it ordered the Sixth Area Army to cooperate with the North China Area Army in the Laohokou sector. The Fouyang-Changtai-kuan-Tungpai line, which had divided the areas of responsibility of the North China Area Army and the Sixth Area Army, was extended from Tungpai through Tsaoyang and Fanchengchen to Paokang.

The North China Area Army employed its 12th Army in the Lacho-kou Operation while the Sixth Area Army employed its 20th Army in the Chihkiang Operation and used the 34th Army to support the Lachokou Operation.

The 12th Army was faced by the 1st War Sector Army, commanded by Hu Tsung-Nan, which was one of the superior armies of the Chinese forces. The 34th Army faced the 5th War Sector Army, commanded by Liu Chih. In the past the Japanese forces had inflicted heavy losses on this Army and it was estimated that its present strength was only about five armies (approximately 10 divisions).

After the Peiping-Hankou Operation in spring of the previous year, the 12th Army occupied the area east of the Hsinan-Changtai-kuan line. The 34th Army occupied positions from Changtaikuan south to Ichang. The enemy was entrenched close to the Japanese lines.



Following the Hunan-Kwangsi Operation, the 20th Army occupied the sector east of the Youngfeng-Shaoyang-Tunganshih line with the enemy drawn up close to its lines. The enemy in the Chihkiang sector was the newly organized Third Area Army, and was equipped with modern American weapons. (Map 27)

Laohokou Operation

12th Army Operation

General Operational Plan

In January 1945, the commander of the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to attack Laohokou. The 12th Army commander, therefore, ordered his units to assemble before 20 March as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	Place of Concentration
110th Div (6 inf bns and 2 mt arty btries)	Vicinity of Tengfeng, Linju and Linjuchen
115th Div (7 inf bns and 1 15 cm howitzer regt)	Vicinity of Swiping
3d Armd Div (some tanks, 1 inf regt and 2 arty bns)	Vicinity of Hsiangcheng, Yehhsien and Chiahsien
The 4th Cav Brig	Zone behind the 115th Div
 The Yuhsi Area Unit (3 inf bns and 1 mt arty btry of the 110th Div)	Vicinity of Iyang

^{1.} General Tang En-po, who had commanded the 31st Army Group during the Peiping-Hankou Operation, was appointed commander of the Third Area Army. The exact date of appointment is not known.

Unit

Place of Concentration

The Yoshitake Det (2 inf bns and 1 hv arty bn under the command of a brig comdr of the 117th Div) Vicinity of Yuhsien

Part of the 44th Air Regt (recon unit) to cooperate with ground operations

Chenghsien airfield

At the same time, the 12th Army commander drew up his operational plan, a summary of which was:

General Policy:

The main force of the Army will open its offensive about 18 March and will capture enemy positions in the vicinity of Lushan, Wuyang and Shahotien by surprise. It will then immediately advance to the Hsihsiakou-Laohokou line.

Outline of Plan

The Yuhsi Area Unit will advance by way of the Loyang-Lushih road, break through enemy territory west of Changshuichen and hold in check as many of the enemy as possible. In order to facilitate the operations of the main force of the Army, this unit will take action to make it appear that the Army contemplates attacking Changan.

The 110th Division will break through tho enemy lines near Lushan and advance to the area northwest of Nanyang via the Lushan-Nanchao road where it will prepare for an attack on Nanyang.

The 3d Armored Division will break through the enemy lines confronting it and advance as quickly as possible to the Hsihsiakou-Hsichuan line, via the Paoani sector. The main force of the 115th Division will penetrate enemy positions in the Shahotien sector, while an element will advance to Wuyang. The Division will then advance toward the southern part of Manyang where it will prepare for an assault on Manyang.

Following the 115th Division, the 4th Cavalry Brigade (one infantry battalion attached) will advance and capture the airfields at Laoho-kou.

The Yoshitake Detachment, following the route of the 3d Armored Division, will advance toward Nanyang, mopping up enemy remnants along the way.

Progress of Operation (Map 28)

On 22 March, the 12th Army units opened a general offensive and broke through the enemy lines confronting them. On 27 March, the 4th Cavalry Brigade captured Laohokou airfield but failed in its attempt to capture the city.

The 110th and 115th Divisions opened their attacks on Nanyang in a concerted effort from the north and south. The 110th Division captured advanced enemy positions but most of the enemy in the vicinity immediately withdrew to the west. The Army, therefore, ordered the divisions to suspend their attacks on Nanyang. The 110th Division was ordered to advance toward Hsihsiakou and the 115th Division toward the Likuanchiao-Laohokou line. By 2 April, with the exception of Laohokou, both divisions had fulfilled their missions.

The 3d Armored Division had been ordered to advance directly to the Hsihsiakou-Hsichuan line. Due to the poor condition of the

roads, however, the Division's advance was slowed down and it was not until 2 April that, together with the 110th and 115th Divisions advancing along both flanks, it occupied its assigned area.


As the enemy was strongly entrenched at Lachokou, the Army decided to suspend the attack on this city until after the concentration of heavy artillery in the forward area. On 7 April, as most of the guns were in position, the 115th Division then opened the offensive and, on the following day, occupied the town.

On 31 March, the Yoshitake Detachment, reinforced by one heavy artillery regiment, one field artillery battalion and part of an armored division, attacked and captured Nanyang.

The Yuhsi Area Unit broke through the enemy lines confronting it and advanced to Changshuichen.²

The 34th Army, which had hitherto been charged with the mission of guarding the Wuchang-Hankou area, was ordered by the Sixth Area Army to conduct an operation against the Hsiangyang area in support of the North China Area Army's Lachokou Operation. The 34th Army, in turn, ordered the 39th Division (less one infantry battalion) and the Composite Unit of seven infantry battalions to carry out this operation.

^{2.} The above plan and details of operation were reconstructed from information supplied from memory by Maj Gen Motoo Nakayama, formerly Chief of Staff, 12th Army.



On 21 March, the 39th Division, concentrated near Kingmen, began its attack on the enemy in the direction of Hsiangyang via Nanchang. Also on the 21st, the Composite Unit, which had assembled east of Kingmen, advanced toward Hsiangyang along the western bank of the Han Chiang. Both forces had been ordered to resort to guerrilla tactics; however, some units made a show of force at Kingshan, Chunghsiang and other places on the eastern bank of the Han Chiang as a diversion during the advance of the 39th Division.

As Lachokou was receiving strong reinforcements during the 12th Army's attack on the city, the 12th and 34th Armies agreed to send a powerful detachment to the Kucheng area to prevent further reinforcements from reaching Lachokou and to cut the routes used by the Chinese in attacking from the city.

On the 25th, the 39th Division captured Nanchang and, about the 28th, advanced to Hsiangyang and Fanchengehen. At the same time, the Composite Unit occupied Hsiangyang.

Upon receiving information that the 12th Army had occupied Laohokou airfield, the detachment sent to capture Kucheng turned back.

After Hsiangyang and Fanchengchen had been occupied, the units there took the offensive against the enemy reinforcements on their way to Laohokou and mopped up the enemy in the area. As soon as the 12th Army captured Laohokou in early April, the units occupying Hsiangyang and Fanchengchen began to return to their former stations

and were in position about mid-April.3

Counteroffensive by the 1st War Sector Army

Immediately upon its arrival at the Hsihsiakou-Laohokou line, the 12th Army established fortifications there in order to protect itself against enemy counteroffensives.

About mid-April, the 1st War Sector Army opened an offensive against the 110th Division. This division was a weak force of six infantry battalions, three of which were to the east of Hsipingchen and three to the east of Chingtzekuan, and was helpless in the face of the enemy. The Army ordered two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, previously attached to the armored division, to reinforce the 110th Division but results were still unsatisfactory. Five more infantry battalions were rushed to the area and, on 29 April, the Division began an offensive. However, the enemy force, which was estimated at about fourteen divisions, inflicted tremendous casualties on the Japanese and, on 10 May, the 110th Division suspended its attack in order to reform its lines. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the enemy attacked but this time the Japanese succeeded in pushing them back.

During early June, the enemy became inactive in this sector.

For about one week from 18 June, the Army was engaged in reestablish-

^{3.} The supporting operation of the 34th Army was written from information supplied from memory by Major Sentaro Azuma, formerly a staff officer of the Sixth Area Army.

ing its lines and in conducting attacks against outlying enemy positions. It then received instructions for the withdrawal of the 117th Division and the 3d Armored Division in preparation for their transfers, the former to Manchuria and the latter for concentration near Peiping. The 12th Army was then assigned garrison duty.4

Chihkiang Operation

The Sixth Area Army directed the 20th Army to conduct the Chih-kiang Operation about mid-April. At that time the 20th Army was composed of the 116th Division, one infantry regiment of the 47th Division (en route from Japan) an element of the 68th Division and one infantry regiment of the 34th Division (which had been dispatched from the 11th Army).

Operational Plan of the 20th Army

Policy:

The main force of the 20th Army will advance through the area to the north of the Shao-yang-Tungkow-Ankiang road while an element will advance from the Hsinhwa-Hsinning sector. If possible, the Army will destroy the enemy to the west of the Tungkow-Wukanghsien sector, but should the enemy elude them there, the Army will pursue and destroy the enemy in the sector east of the Yuan Chiang. The Army will then advance as rapidly as possible to Chihkiang where it will cap-

^{4.} The foregoing was written from information supplied from memory by Maj Gen Motoo Nakayama, formerly Chief of Staff of the 12th Army.

ture and destroy the enemy's airfields.

Outline of Operation:

The main objectives of this operation will be to defeat the enemy in the field in and around the Yungfeng Range, and thereafter to occupy and destroy the Chihkiang airfields. In the early phase of the operation, the actions of the various units of the Army will be directed toward the annihilation of the enemy in the field. It is estimated that this phase will be completed in three months.

By 10 April, the Shigehiro Detachment (composed mainly of one infantry regiment of the 47th Division) will assemble in the sector south of Hsinhwa, the 116th Division will assemble near Shaoyang and the Sekine Detachment (two battalions of the 58th Infantry Brigade of the 68th Division and the 217th Infantry Regiment of the 34th Division) near Tunganshih and south of Hsinning. These units will commence to move about 15 April. The Shigehiro Detachment will attack the enemy from the rear and will cut their route of retreat in the Ankiang sector via Hwangniching. The main force of the ll6th Division will advance along the route north of the Shaoyang-Tungkow-Ankiang road while an element will advance along a route south of this road in order to capture the enemy in and around Tungkow, Hsimatan and Wawutang. The Sekine Detachment, advancing along the Tunganshih-Hsinning-Wuyang-Wawutang road will capture the enemy northwest of Wukanghsien.

If the Army should fail to capture the enemy in the area west of Tungkow and Wukanghsien, the Shigehiro Detachment and the 116th Division will advance as rapidly as possible to the Ankiang area and the Sekine Detachment to Hungkiang in order to capture the enemy in the area east of the Ankiang-Hungkiang-Yuan Chiang sector.

After destroying the enemy field forces, the Sekine Detachment will proceed along the Hungkiang-Chihkiang road and the Shigehiro Detachment and the 116th Division through Ankiang, Yushuwan and Chihkiang and the area north of these villages, and will capture and destroy the Chihkiang airfields.

Upon the 47th Division's arrival in early May, it will advance and attack the Chihkiang sector via Hsinhwa and Hsupuhsien and, if circumstances demand, it will then proceed to Chenchi.

Operational plans subsequent to the capture of Chihkiang will be published at a later date.

Progress of Operation (Map 29)

On 3 April 1945, the Shigehiro Detachment left Youngfeng and passing through Lengshuikang, on 28 April arrived in the area near Yangchi. Here its advance to Ankiang was stopped by the fierce attacks of three divisions of the Chinese 18th and 73d Armies. The Army directed the Detachment to hold its positions near Yangchi until the arrival of the main force of the 47th Division from Japan.⁵

The 116th Division, divided into three columns with its main strength in the right column, between 13 and 15 April started its advance from near Sheoyang. About 25 April it arrived in the Chiliwan-Tungkow sector. There the right column was faced by a strong enemy force near Chiliwan while the central and left columns made repeated thrusts against stubborn enemy forces blocking the way near Hweilung-kiao.


^{5.} The main force of the 47th Division was delayed due to shortage of transport facilities.

On the night of 15 April, the Sekine Detachment advanced from Tunganshih and the district to the south of Hsinning and, on the 17th, captured Hsinning. An element of the Detachment then began a diversionary action near Wukanghsien while the main force advanced toward Wuyang. On 27 April, the Detachment occupied Wuyang. On 4 May, it occupied Wawutang and then attacked the powerful enemy force in and around the Yurgfeng Range.

Reinforcements steadily strengthened the enemy's lines and by the early part of May the situation had become a stalemate.

As it was unable to advance due to its being harassed by a superior enemy air force and to the large number of enemy reinforcements arriving in the area, the 20th Army commander decided to regroup his forces and destroy the enemy in the vicinity of Tungkow while awaiting the arrival of the 47th Division. On 4 May, it ordered the 116th Division to assemble near Tungkow and Sanmen and the Sekine Detachment to assemble in the vicinity of Wantowkiao. On 9 May the 116th Division began to withdraw and, by the 16th, had assembled in its assigned area, while on 5 May the Sekine Detachment began its withdrawal and, by the 15th, had assembled its troops near Wantowkiao.

Upon the arrival of the main force of the 47th Division (Division headquarters and one infantry regiment) on 6 May, the 20th Army directed this division to advance to Chukowpu and Mawangao and there absorb the Shigehiro Detachment. It was also ordered to cover the



retreat of the 116th Division. On 20 May, the van of the 47th Division reached Mawangao.

In the meantime, the commander of the Sixth Area Army sent an element of the 34th Army to the vicinity of Changsha to serve as a reserve for the 20th Army. Anticipating an enemy counteroffensive in the event of failure of the 20th Army's operations, the Sixth Area Army commander planned to concentrate his main force near Chuanhsien and to launch an offensive from there in order to recover the situation. He planned to use the 11th Army and the 3d and 13th Divisions which were, at that time, being moved from the Kweilin area to the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Preparations were in progress when, on 9 May, orders were received from the China Expeditionary Army to suspend the Chinkiang Operation. The Area Army, therefore, ordered the 20th Army to discontinue the operation and to return to its previous position. On 12 May, the Area Army placed the 34th Division under the command of the 20th Army.

On 12 May, the 34th Division was directed to dispatch one infantry regiment to the vicinity of Taohwaping in order to facilitate the evacuation of the Sekine Detachment, while the main strength of the division was to concentrate immediately near Hsinning.

In compliance with instructions, by 25 May the 47th Division had withdrawn to Chukowpu, the 116th Division to the vicinity of Tantow and Yenkowpu and the Sekine Detachment to the Taohwaping area. By 30 May, the Sekine Detachment had withdrawn to the Tzu Chiang.


On 1 June, the 47th Division was ordered to concentrate in the vicinity of Youngfeng, the 116th Division in the vicinity of Shaoyang, the Sekine Detachment in the area southwest of Shaoyang and the main strength of the 34th Division in the vicinity of Shihmensze while the main force of the 86th Independent Mixed Brigade was ordered to occupy prepared positions west of Shaoyang to afford protection to the retreating forces.

By 10 June, the disposition of all units was completed as instructed.

Japanese losses during this operation were 1,500 killed and 5,000 wounded.

^{6.} Information in regard to the Chihkiang Operation was obtained from a manuscript written from personal recollections by officers of the 20th Army headquarters at the end of World War II.

MAP-CHAPTER 6 MAP NO. 30



Chapter 6

Preparations for Operations Against United States and Soviet Forces

Operations to Occupy Strategic Areas in Order to Secure the Lines of Communication Along the China Coast

General Operational Plan

After the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan, submarine attacks against Japanese ships gradually increased. In the spring of 1942, enemy submarines were appearing in the Formosa Straits and off the China coast. Imperial General Headquarters received many reports stating that enemy submarine bases had been established somewhere in south China. In the summer of 1942, Yungchia was occupied by the 13th Army during the Chekiang-Kiangsi Operation as a measure to counter the activities of these submarines. 1 Even after this operation, however, reports continued to be received in regard to these bases. During 1944 the war situation in the central Pacific grew worse. In the summer of that year Saipan and Guam fell into enemy hands and an invasion of the Philippines was imminent. Imperial General Headquarters planned to strengthen defenses on Okinawa and Formosa in order to meet any attempt by the enemy to sever lines of communication between the Japanese Homeland and the southern areas. Further, believing that the enemy planned to land on the China

^{1.} Monograph No. 71, Army Operations in China, Dec 1941 - Dec 1943, Chapter 3.

coast, it was important that surface transportation off the China coast be secured and relay bases for naval vessels be established. Plans were made, therefore, to start operations in eastern Chekiang Province during early or mid-August 1944.

On 18 July, Imperial General Headquarters issued the following instructions to the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army:

Imperial General Headquarters plans to occupy key points on the coast of eastern Chekiang Province.

The Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army will capture key areas on the coast of eastern Chekiang Province and secure these areas.

During this operation, the commander of the Formosa Army will assist in maintaining the lines of communication of the China Expeditionary Army.

Imperial General Headquarters then drew up an operational plan which it directed the China Expeditionary Army to undertake. The essentials of this plan were:

Operational Objectives:

To capture and hold the main coastal areas in eastern Chekiang Province in order to prevent any attempt by the United States forces to land in that area as well as to secure surface transportation and to establish bases for naval combat vessels.

Time of Operation:

The operation is scheduled to be opened in early or mid-August.

Places to be Occupied:

Vital coastal zones near Yungchia and Fuchou. Part of the force will reinforce Hsiamen.²

Command of Forces:

This operation is to be carried out by the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army in cooperation with the Commander of the China Area Fleet.

The commander of the 13th Army in Shanghai will be directed to undertake the operation and part of the 5th Air Army will support it. The commander of the Formosa Army will assist in protecting the lines of communication of the China Expeditionary Army.

Strength to be Employed:3

Yungchia area Fuchou area Hsiamen area four infantry battalions four infantry battalions one infantry battalion

At this time, Imperial General Headquarters also published the following Central Army-Navy Agreement:

Operational Objectives:

To capture and hold the main coastal areas in eastern Chekiang Province in order to prevent the United States forces landing in this area as well as to secure surface transportation and to establish relay bases for naval combat vessels.

^{2.} Hsiamen had been occupied by Japanese naval forces since 1938.

^{3.} The four infantry battalions for the Yungchia area were to be supplied by the 70th Division of the 13th Army but the other units were to be sent from Japan.

Time of Operation:

Between the beginning and middle of August.

Landing Sites:

Key areas on the coast in the vicinity of Yungchia and Fuchou. One unit will reinforce the Hsiamen area.

Command:

This operation will be carried out jointly by the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army and the Commander of the China Area Fleet.

The Commander of the Formosa Army will support the lines of communication of the China Expeditionary Army.

The Commander of the Combined Fleet will order units under the command of the Second Air Fleet commander to cooperate with the Commander of the China Area Fleet in ship escort duty and in landing operations.

The 13th Army commander will be responsible for the Army operation, which will be supported by part of the 5th Air Army.

Navy operations will be directed by the Commander of the China Area Fleet.

Strength to be Employed:

Army: Yungchia area four infantry battalions Fuchou area four infantry battalions Hsiamen area one infantry battalion

Navy: Part of the China Area Fleet.

The units in the Yungchia and Fuchou areas will be commanded by an Army officer while the unit in the Hsiamen area will be commanded by a Navy officer.

Details will be decided upon by agreement between the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army and the Commander of the China Area Fleet.

Security measures for new areas of occupation will be determined at conferences between the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army and the Commander of the China Area Fleet.

With the continued deterioration of the situation in the Pacific and the increasing demands for troops and munitions in that area, it was found impossible to begin the Eastern Chekiang Operation in August as first planned. It was decided, therefore, to launch this operation about mid-September.

A land attack by the 13th Army was planned against the Yungchia area, while Fuchou and Hsiamen were to be attacked from the sea. The 70th Division of the 13th Army was to advance to Lishui. The Nashio-ka Detachment (four infantry battalions) was then to be detached from the main body of the division, and would advance and capture Yungchia. Upon confirmation of the occupation of Yungchia, the main body of the division would return to its former position. The 62d Independent Mixed Brigade from Shanghai was to be escorted in convoy by the Navy to the mouth of the Lien Chiang in order to capture Fuchou. Also convoys were scheduled to leave Shanghai in order to capture Hsiamen


^{4.} The 62d Independent Mixed Brigade was activated at Shikoku, Japan in July 1944 and then dispatched to Shanghai.

Progress of Operations (Map 31)

Yungchia Area Operation: On 22 August, the 70th Division of the 13th Army, having concentrated near Wui, opened its offensive. After breaking through the enemy's lines, on the 27th, in the face of heavy resistance, the Division captured Lishui. Also on the 27th, the Nashioka Detachment started its drive toward Yungchia. While advancing along the north bank of the Ou Chiang the Detachment met a group of Japanese boats transporting war materials along the river. The boats were under fire from hostile units and the Detachment immediately attacked and repelled this enemy force. It then crossed the river at a point near Jentientsun and continued its advance toward Yungchia from the southwest. On 9 September, it occupied Yungchia without enemy resistance. As the 13th Army commander then considered it desirable to secure the Paishihchieh area east of Yungchia, on 14 September, a major part of the Detachment crossed to the north bank of the Ou Chiang and occupied the Paishihchieh-Lochiang area. Small elements secured Yungchia and the surrounding key points.

On 14 September, the 70th Division was ordered to return to its former position. It started back on the 16th and, without encountering enemy troops, on the 24th arrived at Wui.

^{5.} Information in regard to the foregoing plans was obtained from notes made by Lt Col Ishiwari at the time.



Fuchou Area Operation: On 24 September, the 62d Independent Mixed Brigade (minus one battalion) left Shanghai aboard a convoy of six Navy-escorted ships. No enemy was encountered on the way, and on the night of the 26th they anchored off Fuchou. Before day-break on the 27th, the Brigade effectively launched two surprise landings (the main body of the Brigade landed at Sungwu and an element at Taso.) Landing operations were completed on the 28th and the ships left the anchorage and headed toward Formosa.

The main body of the Chinese 80th Division was entrenched in a series of defenses built at graduating heights encircling the walled city of Fuchou for a distance of approximately eight kilometers. On the morning of 2 October, the 62d Independent Mixed Brigade opened its attack. The battle raged throughout that day and part of the might. By the afternoon of the 3d, however, they had passed through Lington and, on the morning of the 4th, having overcome the enemy at Tangling, they advanced toward the Fuchou valley. Later that day they occupied Fuchou. Also on the 4th, the left flank detachment (one infantry battalion) which had advanced southward from Lienchiang, occupied two islands in the mouth of Lien Chiang.

Hsiamen Area Operation: On 6 October, one battalion of the 62d Independent Mixed Brigade left Shanghai under Navy escort. On 9 October, it arrived at Hsiamen and at once effected a landing. This detachment was under the command of the Naval Landing Force commander.

^{6.} The description of these operations was obtained from telegrams in the files of the 1st Demobilization Bureau.

Plans for Operations against American and Russian Forces and Redeployment of Strength in China

During 1945, as the war situation in the Pacific rapidly grew worse the probability of Japan and China being attacked from the sea increased. During the latter part of January 1945, Imperial General Headquarters issued the following directive to the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army:

Imperial General Headquarters plans to crush the enemy's will to fight by destroying the invading United States forces and thus securing the national defense zone with the Homeland as its center.

The Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army will exert every effort to check the United States forces invading China. Vital areas in China will be held and the Chungking regime will be destroyed.

This mission will be carried out as follows:

Strategic areas in China will be strengthened as soon as possible. The national defense zone, with the Homeland as its center, will be secured by defeating the enemy invading from east and west. In order to achieve this, emphasis will be placed on the strengthening of Japanese forces in central and south China, especially in the key area in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River.

Strong pressure will be applied in order to destroy the Chungking regime's fighting potential and also to combat the political influence of the United States. In addition, every effort will be exerted to check enemy air activities in China.

The Army will establish operational bases and take steps to stabilize the occupied areas, particularly in north China and in the key area

in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River in order to facilitate the acquisition of vital war materials.

All ground operations, with the exception of minor attacks by raiding parties, west of the following line will be effected in accordance with separate orders: West Sunit to Pailingmiao, along the Huang Ho and western border of Shansi Province, through Laohokou, Ichang, Shoushan, Ipehhsien and Liuchowhsien.

The Air Force will cooperate in the Formosa and Okinawa Operations.

The Army will maintain communications with the Southern areas and will cooperate with the Navy in escorting sea traffic.

When considered desirable by the China Expeditionary Army commander, the commanders of the Kwantung Army, Southern Army, Tenth Area Army and the China Area Fleet will cooperate during any of the above operations. Part of the forces under the command of the foregoing or under the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army commander may operate outside its area of responsibility with the knowledge and consent of the commander of the area to be entered. 7

Reorganization and Disposition of Forces in the China Theater

With the opening of Ichi-Go Operation in 1944, fourteen independent infantry brigades had been disposed in China, either to replace divisions which had been transferred to the Southern Area or to maintain the security of added areas of occupation. During the latter half of 1944 four divisions (26th and 62d Divisions from north

^{7.} The Imperial General Headquarters order was reconstructed from notes made at the time by Lt Col Ishiwari.

^{8.} See Map 2.

China and the 22d and 37th Divisions from central China) were transferred to the Philippines, Okinawa and French Indo-China. These divisions were replaced by the 114th, 115th, 117th and 118th Divisions (organized in July 1944 from independent infantry or independent mixed brigades and other units) and also by the 62d Independent Mixed Brigade, which had been sent from Japan to participate in the Eastern Chekiang Operation (Fuchou Operation). In March 1945, the 43d Army Headquarters was organized in Shantung Province and the 59th Division, 5th and 9th Independent Mixed Brigades and the 1st Independent Infantry Brigade were placed under its command.

Between early March and mid-April, independent infantry brigades, independent mixed brigades and field replacement units were reorganized into the 129th, 130th, 131st, 132d, 133d and 161st Divisions. After completing the reorganization, three of these divisions were placed under the command of the 23d Army, two under the 13th Army and one under the 34th Army. In addition, eight independent mixed brigades were established, four being assigned to the 13th Army and four to the 20th Army, while 13 independent garrison units were established and attached mainly to the North China Area Army with a small number being attached to the armies in central China. The composition of the China Expeditionary Army at the end of April 1945 was as shown on Chart No. 2.

^{9.} These brigades and garrison units were organized from replacements mobilized in Japan and shipped to China. Although the officers, for the most part, were trained, the troops received very little, if any, training before arrival in China.

China Expeditionary Army Forces in China (late April 1945)

Chart No. 2

Major Commands		Units			
	Commanded di- rectly by the Area Army	63d Div, 1st, 8th Ind Mix Brigs 2d Ind Inf Brig, 3d, 7th Ind Gar Units			
Lmy	lst Army	69th, 114th Divs, 3d Ind Mix Brig, 10th, 14th Ind Inf Brigs, 5th Ind Gar Unit			
North China Area Army	12th Army	110th, 115th, 117th Divs, 3d TKD, 4th Cav Brig, 92d Ind Mix Brig, 6th, 13th, 14th, 16th Ind Gar Units			
	43d Army	59th Div, 5th, 9th Ind Mix Brigs, 1st Ind Inf Brig, 9th, 11th, 12th Ind Gar Units			
	Mongolia Garrison Army	118th ^D iv, 2d Ind Mix Brig, 4th Ind Gar Unit			
	Commanded di- rectly by the Area Army	47th Div			
	llth Army	3d, 13th, 34th, 58th Divs, 22d, 88th Ind Mix Brigs			
Sixth Area Army	20th Army	64th, 68th, 116th Divs, 81st, 82d, 86th, 87th Ind Mix Brigs, 2d Ind Gar Unit			
	34th Army	39th, 132d Divs, 17th Ind Mix Brig, 5th, 7th, 11th, 12th Ind Inf Brigs			
	23d Army	27th, 40th, 104th, 129th, 130th, 131st Divs, 19th, 23d Ind Mix Brigs, 8th, 13th Ind Inf Brigs, Hong Kong Defense Force			
13th Army		60th, 61st, 65th, 70th, 133d, 161st Divs, 62d, 89th, 90th, 91st Ind Mix Brigs, 6th Ind Inf Brig, 1st Ind Gar Unit			

In February, in order to meet enemy attacks from the east and south sea fronts as well as the United States and Chinese forces in the west, the 5th Air Army organized the 13th Air Division. Components of this division were two fighter regiments (16th and 19th), two light bomber regiments (6th and 41st) and one independent air company (54th).

With Germany's capitulation in May, Imperial General Headquarters estimated that Russia would soon enter the war against Japan. It was, therefore, planned to place the 3d, 13th, 27th and 34th Divisions under the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army and employ them in the defense of Manchuria. However, as these divisions were in the southwest and could not arrive for some time, four other divisions (39th, 59th, 63d and 117th) which were closer to Manchuria were placed under the command of the Kwantung Army¹⁰ and the 5th Air Army was placed in the order of battle of the Air General Army. At the same time, the 13th Air Division (composed mainly of the Headquarters, 3d Air Brigade; 9th, 48th and 90th Air Regiments; one company of the 44th Air Regiment and the 54th Independent Air Company) of the 5th Air Army was placed under the command of the Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Army. The headquarters of the 5th Air Army was set up in Seoul and the balance of its forces moved into

^{10.} Monograph No. 138, <u>Preparations for Operations in Manchuria</u>, 1943 - 1945, Chapter VI.

Korea and north China.

Earlier, in order to strengthen the forces in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, the 69th Division from the 1st Army and the 118th Division from the Mongolia Garrison Army had been placed under the command of the 13th Army.

In January, the 6th Army Headquarters was assigned to the China Expeditionary Army. The 70th and 133d Divisions and the 62d, 89th and 91st Brigades of the 13th Army were placed under the command of the 6th Army and the 6th Army, under the control of the 13th Army commander, 11 was ordered by the China Expeditionary Army to defend the Hangchou area.

In June, the 34th Army Headquarters was moved to north Korea while its forces remained in the Wuchang-Hankou area under the direct command of the Sixth Area Army.

In January 1945, operational preparations against American landings on the coast of China were started in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River and at Canton. However, the abrogation of the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact in early April was regarded as a strong indication that the Russians would soon enter the war against Japan. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, decided in mid-April to concentrate four divisions in vital areas in north and central China and

^{11.} The 13th Army commander was senior to the 6th Army commander.

directed the China Expeditionary Army to assemble the 3d, 13th, 272 and 34th Divisions in central China for this purpose.

By the end of May, with Okinawa obviously lost, Imperial Coneral Headquarters ordered the evacuation of areas along the Aman-Kwangsi and Canton-Hankou railway lines in the provinces of Munan, Kwangsi and Kiangsi in order to strengthen the strategic positions in north and central China.

China Expeditionary Army's Operational Plan Against the United States and Soviet Forces

In June 1945, the China Expeditionary Army published the following plan against the United States and Russia and made appropriate preparations.

Operational Policy:

The main force of the China Expeditionary Army will secure vital areas in north and central China in an attempt to carry out delaying actions against Russia and China and also to destroy the American forces invading the key areas along the China coast.

Emphasis on battle preparations against the American forces will be placed first in the triangular zone in central China (the area in and around Shanghai) and then on the Shantung Peninsula. However, should the enemy attempt to land in central or north China, the China Expeditione ary Army will immediately assemble its main strength in these areas.

Nanching, Peiping, and the Wuchang-Hankou sector will be held at any cost.

Operational Plan:

The 23d Army will evacuate its units in remote areas to the vicinity of Canton as soon as possible in order to secure the key areas in the vicinity of Canton and Hong Kong. It will complete its preparations for operations against the American and British forces before the beginning of August.

Immediately after smashing the enemy in the Tayu-Nanhsiung area, the 27th, 40th and 131st Divisions will be sent via Nanchang to the area near Nanching when they will be placed under the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army.

The 13th Army will withdraw its forces from the Fuchou and Yungchia sectors. Its main strength will occupy the triangular area in central China while elements will occupy key areas along the Yangtze River below Hukou and along the southern section of the Tienching-Pukou railway line. Further, the Army will complete its operational preparations against the United States forces before August in the triangular area in central China and before October in the Tunghai sector. The Army will also construct retrenchments around Nanching and liaison bases near Tungshan.

The North China Area Army will secure the key areas in north China and complete its operational preparations on the Shantung Peninsula against the United States forces by the end of September. Also, by the end of September, the Area Army, in cooperation with the Kwantung Army, will complete preparations for operations against Russia.

During September, the 92d Independent Mixed Brigade will be sent to Tungshan where it will be returned to the command of the 13th Army.

The main force of the 12th Army in Honan Province and part of the 1st Army in south Shansi Province will prepare to evacuate. The Sixth Area Army first will withdraw its forces as shown below and then place the llth and 20th Armies in position to protect the Wuchang-Hankou sector from a possible general counteroffensive by the Chungking forces in concert with American landings.

The 47th Division will be sent to Licheng and placed under the command of the 43d Army.

The 11th Army will be withdrawn from the Kweilin-Liuchowhsien sector. The 3d, 13th and 34th Divisions will be sent to the area in the vicinity of Nanching via Hsiaochihkou. There they will return to the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army.

The 20th Army will be withdrawn from the Changsha-Hengyang sector. The 68th Division and the 22d and 88th Independent Mixed Brigades will be sent to Peiping or Licheng, if required, and there placed under the command of the North China Area Army. The 116th Division and the 86th and 87th Independent Mixed Brigades will be sent to Nanching and there returned to the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army.

In preparation for operations against an American offensive, steps will be taken immediately to establish strong positions or cave positions by utilizing the terrain to the utmost in order to withstand enemy bombardment and tank attacks for a long period; also to encourage special attacks on the ground, in the air and by the sea, and to increase the production of weapons and equipment.

In the event of an American-British attack on key areas in south China, the 23d Army will secure the Canton-Hong Kong area and destroy the enemy at any cost.

In the event of an American landing in the triangular area of central China, the 13th Army

will secure the key area in the vicinity of Shanghai and make every effort to destroy the enemy. After their arrival at Nanching, 12 divisions will be sent to reinforce the 13th Army. However, the procedure for the operations may be changed to some extent, depending on the strength of the American forces, landing point and the time of landing.

Should the United States forces land on the Shantung Peninsula, the 43d and 13th Armies will secure the coastal area and check the enemy's advance inland with the strength located near the enemy's landing area while the divisions assembled in the Licheng area as well as other units of the North China Area Army will move forward and destroy the enemy. The procedure may be changed, depending on the strength of the American forces, landing point and time of landing, or should Russia enter the war.

The main force of the 12th Army in Honan Province and that part of the 1st Army which is in southern Shansi Province will evacuate to Shantung Province after the Japanese forces being transferred from the Wuchang-Hankou sector have passed through the area or at a time that is appropriate according to the war situation.

Part of the reconnaissance units of the 13th Air Division will be attached to the Sixth Area Army and the 23d Army. The main force of the 13th Air Division will be deployed for operations first in the triangular area of central China and thereafter on the Shantung Peninsula. In the event American forces attempt to attack the north or central China coast, the entire 13th Air Division will destroy the enemy convoys at sea.

^{12.} The 3d, 13th, 27th, 34th, 40th and 131st Divisions were expected to arrive at the end of August while the 116th Division and 86th and 87th Independent Mixed Brigades were scheduled to arrive in late October.

Imperial General Headquarters may order some ground divisions and the main force of the 13th Air Division transferred to Korea or south Manchuria.

The China Area Fleet will coordinate closely with the China Expeditionary Army and will be charged with the defense of and sea operations around Hainan Island, Hsiamen and the Chushan Archipelago.

In the execution of ground operations, units of the area Fleet will receive orders from the area Army commanders on the spot.

Operational Command on the South China Coast:

The 23d Army will at once evacuate its forces situated in remote areas to the Canton area as follows:

The main force of the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade (on Hainan Island) and the 31st Independent Infantry Regiment (on Chinmen Island).

After the withdrawal of forces from the Kweilin-Liuchowhsien and Kanhsien-Nanhsiung sectors, the Haikang Detachment (composed mainly of two infantry battalions) and forces in the areas along the Hsi Chiang and the southern part of the Canton-Hankou railway will be withdrawn.

The Swatow Detachment (two and a half infantry battalions) will be evacuated immediately after completing the removal of war materials from the Swatow area to the Canton-Hong Kong area.

The 23d Army will construct strong fortification in the areas surrounding Canton and Hong Kong. Canton will be defended by the main strength of the Army and Hong Kong by an element.

Special care will be taken with the construction of fortifications around these two cities in order that they will withstand fierce enemy attacks.

The 23d Army will keep in close contact with the Tenth Area Army (Formosa) the 2d China Expeditionary Fleet and the Hainan Naval Guard District. It will take appropriate guard and observation measures in order to detect in advance any imminent enemy landings.

Should the American and British forces carry out a landing in the Canton area, the 23d Army will employ its main strength in the fortifications in depth to stop the enemy's advance. Canton and Hong Kong will be held, regardless of the cost.

If American and British forces land on the coast east of Haifeng before the withdrawal of the Swatow Detachment, all forces of the 23d Army in this area will attempt to prevent the enemy's advance to the Canton area, while the 23d Army's main strength will defend Canton, as described above.

Operations in Central China:

In order to prevent possible landings of American forces on the banks of the Yangtze River, or the coastal area of Hangchou Bay in an attempt to occupy the Shanghai area, the main strength of the 13th Army will construct strong fortifications in depth in the key areas in the vicinity of Shanghai, Taitsang, Wuhsi and Chiahsing while an element will construct strong fortifications in the vicinity of Ningpo and along the northern bank of the Yangtze River.

The 13th Army will charge the 6th Army with the responsibility of constructing strong fortifications in the vicinity of Sungchiang, Chiahsing, Hangchou and Ningpo.

About 27 June, by which time the 40th and 131st Divisions marching from the Kanhsien-Nanhsiung sector to the vicinity of Nanching will

have passed Nanchang, the 13th Army will evacuate its forces situated near Chinhua to positions north of Chuchi in order to contract the Japanese lines facing the Chungking Army and to strengthen fortifications in the new areas.

Forces situated in and around Nanching will construct strong last-stand positions around the outskirts of the city.

The China Expeditionary Army will keep in close contact with Imperial General Headquarters, Tenth Area Army (Formosa) and Seventeenth Area Army (Korea) and, in addition, will order the 13th Army to keep in close contact with the China Area Fleet, in order to collect information in regard to possible landings by the American forces. Further, the China Expeditionary Army will order the 13th Air Division to make constant reconnaissance flights along the coastal area so as to detect any enemy attempt to land in the central China area.

The China Expeditionary Army will place one of the divisions, which is to assemble at Nanching, under the command of the 13th Army. All other divisions which are due to assemble at Nanching will be trained under the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army until such time as it becomes apparent that the American forces will land in central China. At this time these divisions will be placed under the command of the 13th Army.

In the event that an American convoy nears the coast of Shanghai, all units of the 13th Air Division will attack the enemy at sea. The Shipping Unit of the 13th Army will also attack the enemy at sea in a joint action with the Navy.

If American forces land on the shores of the Yangtze River or Hangchou Bay, the 13th Army will take no positive action until the arrival of reinforcements. However, it will harass the enemy by using guerrilla tactics at night and such other methods as will diminish the enemy's strength. If reinforcements arrive before the enemy lands, the enemy will be attacked at the landing points without giving them time to organize.

Should the American forces land in the vicinity of Ningpo or on the north bank of the Yangtze River, forces entrenched there will hold their lines, harass the enemy and prevent the establishment of airfields.

Should the American forces land in central China, the North China Area Army will transfer the forces in Honan Province to Shantung Peninsula. The Area Army will also send reinforcements to Nanching, if the situation requires.

Operations on Shantung Peninsula:

The North China Area Army will charge the 43d Army with the responsibility of operational preparations against the American forces on Shantung Peninsula.

The main strength of the 43d Army will not only prepare strong fortifications in the coastal area around Tsingtao and Jihchao but also in the rear areas. A powerful element of the 43d Army will be employed to build a base for an offensive near Licheng.

As it is estimated that the Chinese Army will attack Honan Province and south Shansi Province when the 1st and 12th Armies withdraw to assist the 43d Army, strong fortifications will be built to protect the rear of these armies. Elements of the 1st and 12th Armies will man these fortifications.

In cooperation with the 43d Army, the 13th Army will order the 65th Division to construct fortifications in and around Lienyun and Tunghai as well as an intermediate position near Tungshan.

The 13th Army and 43d Army will guard the coast line in order to detect any movement by

American forces. At the same time, the China Expeditionary Army will collect intelligence in regard to American and Russian movements through Imperial General Headquarters, the Kwantung Army, the Seventeenth Area Army, the Air General Army and other units. If the situation demands, the 13th Air Division will reconnoiter the sea off the Shantung Peninsula in order to detect enemy convoys.

If the United States forces invade the area between Tsingtao and Lienyun, the 43d Army, in concert with the 13th Army, will prevent the enemy from penetrating further into the interior or establishing air bases by stopping them at the fortifications in the coastal areas.

The 13th Air Division will change its disposition immediately in order to assist in this operation and to destroy enemy convoys at sea.

The North China Area Army forces in Honan Province and south Shansi Province will be evacuated immediately. Those forces due to arrive at Nanching will be dispatched to Licheng where they will come under the command of the North China Area Army. Should the enemy invade Licheng, the North China Area Army will launch an offensive from the bases in this area.

If the situation demands, an element of the reinforced divisions will be dispatched to Tungshan and placed under the command of the 13th Army, which will cooperate with the North China Area Army.

In the event the American forces are stopped after occupying the coastal area between Tsingtao and Lienyun, the North China Area Army and the 13th Army will advance to this area and destroy them.

In the event the American Army attacks the tip of the Shantung Peninsula, the main strength of the 13th Air Division will attack the invading convoy and a powerful force from the North

China Area Army (43d Army) will raid and harass any airfield construction work attempted by the enemy. In addition, the air force in Korea will support these operations.

Should Russia enter the war during the progress of operations on Shantung Peninsula, the Mongolia Garrison Army (North China Area Army) and the Jehol Detachment (Kwantung Army)¹³ will secure the key areas in the vicinity of Wanchuan and Chengte, while the forces in the Peiping-Tienching sector will secure this area.

Miscellaneous:

If the American forces do not invade after the 20th Army's withdrawal from the Changsha-Hengyang sector, the 11th Army will be responsible for the occupation of the Wuchang-Hankou sector and the Sixth Area Army Headquarters and the 20th Army Headquarters will be transferred to Licheng and Shanghai respectively.

Operational missions will be changed as follows:

South China Operations 23d Army

Operations in triangular 13th Army (6th and area in Central China 20th Armies)

Shantung Operations Sixth Area Army (12th and 43d Armies)

Defense against Soviet North China Area Army forces

Defense against Chinese llth Armyl4 forces

^{13.} The China Expeditionary Army was responsible for the security of part of Jehol Province.

^{14.} In May 1946 the China Expeditionary Army's plan was reconstructed from memory by officers of the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters.

23d Army's Defense Plan Against United States Forces (Map 32)

In accordance with orders from the China Expeditionary Army, the 23d Army submitted the following operational plans

Operational Policy:

In order to preserve its fighting potential, the Army will reduce its operational front. It will secure the Canton-Hong Kong area where it will carry out a holding action for as long as possible. During this time it will be completely self-supporting.

Operational Command:


First Phase:

The 23d Independent Mixed Brigade, the Hong Kong Defense Force, the 129th Division and the 104th Division will make every effort to prevent the enemy landing in the area east of Pacan but should the enemy succeed in landing, their forces will be obstructed and destroyed wherever possible.

Particular attention will be paid to strengthening positions in order to prevent the enemy driving a wedge between Hong Kong and Canton.

Three infantry battalions of the 104th Division will be disposed in the sector northwest of Haifeng in order to check the enemy in that area. The main force of the Division will be disposed near Huiyang where it will prepare for a mobile defense against the Chinese forces along the Tung Chiang and American forces attempting to land at Bias Bay.

The 129th Division, in coordination with the Hong Kong Defense Force and the 104th Division, will obstruct enemy landings at Bias Bay. The Hong Kong Defense Force will occupy previously constructed positions in the Hong Kong key area and will hold this area.



The forces on the other fronts will do their utmost to check enemy advances. Whenever possible, counteroffensives will be launched against the Chinese forces. If necessary, the Swatow and Haikang Detachments will be transferred to the Canton area.

Second Phase:

If the enemy advances to the Huiyang-Tanshui line, a large force will be disposed between Pinghu and Tanshui and the Shenchuanhsu-Tanshui-Huiyang line will be held. Heavy casualties will be inflicted on the enemy whenever possible.

The 8th Independent Infantry Brigade, the 13th Independent Infantry Brigade and the 130th Division will hold the area including Yuantanhsu, Sanshui and Chiuchiang as long as possible. Detailed orders will be issued later in regard to the time to evacuate Shaochow and Wuchow. An attack against Macau will also be planned.

Third Phase:

In the event the enemy divides the Hong Kong-Canton area into two sectors, the defense unit disposed at the last-stand positions will be reinforced and will absorb the advance units. It will then continue to resist as long as possible.

Communications:

Observation posts equipped with radio sets will be stationed along a 20 km front along the coast from west of Macau to Lufeng. These posts will obtain and transmit as quickly as possible information in regard to enemy landings.

Combat Preparations:

The order of combat preparations will be classified as follows: First, one-third or better of the strength will remain in the positions while the remainder of the force will constructed fortifications and other works. Secondly, one-

half of the strength will remain in the positions, the other half will strengthen the positions. Thirdly, the entire unit will stand ready for combat.

Transportation:

In order to maintain communications between the headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army and its neighboring armies, antiaircraft positions will be strengthened on the airfields near Canton, particularly on Paiyun and Tienho airfields. The Canton-Hankou railway and the main waterways such as Pei Chiang, Tung Chiang and Chu Chiang, will be used for as long as possible.

Lines of Communication:

Canton and Kowloon will be strengthened to serve as self-supporting supply bases. War materials, which will be transported by night or by the "ant system" 15 during the day, will be stored in the positions.

Plans for strengthening the Lungyentung sector, as well as for production, transportation and communication facilities will be published at a later date. 16

Army-Navy Agreement:

During the early stages of a landing, units of the Hong Kong Special Naval Base Force will

^{15.} As the enemy's air strength was vastly superior to the Japanese, during the daylight hours it was impossible to use vehicles to transport supplies, therefore, the men carried everything on their backs. This was known to the Japanese as the "ant system."

^{16.} At the time of the surrender only about 20 per cent of the fortifications planned by the 23d Army had been completed. One of the reasons for the delay was the necessity to reassign fortification personnel to other work. About one-half of the coastal fortifications had been completed but work on the inland fortifications had barely been begun.

perform surface raids against the enemy.

The Army will be responsible for all inland operations, such as in the delta zone near the Chu Chiang, while the Navy will be responsible for operations in the areas along the coast, such as at Pacan and Bias Bay.

The training of personnel to operate the boats and the repairs to the boats will be the Navy's responsibility.17

13th Army Defense Plan Against the United States Forces

In January 1945, in order to cope with possible operations against the United States forces in the triangular zone (the zone between Shanghai, Hangchou and Nanching) the 13th Army began to fortify this area. In view of the inadequate strength of this army, the China Expeditionary Army sent reinforcements in increments while, at the same time, the 13th Army sought to reinforce itself by transferring units stationed at Yungchia and Fuchou to the triangular zone.

In compliance with orders from the China Expeditionary Army, in January 1945 the 13th Army commander began to draw up a new operational plan and, by June, had substantially completed it as follows:

Operational Policy:

As the main force of the China Expeditionary Army for the decisive battle, the 13th Army will strongly defend the key points of the zone of operations. It will be thoroughly prepared to de-

^{17.} The operational plan of the 23d Army was reconstructed from memory by former Lt Col Yoshito Ogata, staff officer in charge of operations, 23d Army after his repatriation in May 1946.

stroy the attacking United States forces and will fight determinedly, thereby establishing a decisive turning point in the Pacific War. Assuming that the triangular zone will be the main area for the decisive battle, operational preparations will be undertaken without delay. The framework of the preparations will be completed by the end of February and detailed preparations will be completed by the end of July. Thereafter, further strengthening and supplementing of operational preparations will be made.

Outline of Operational Plan:

The main body of the Army will firmly defend Shanghai and the bank of the Yangtze River northwest of Shanghai, while elements will defend the southern shore of Hangchou Bay and the vicinity of Lienyun. When the enemy launches an attack, the Army, in close cooperation with naval and air units, will launch continuous and vigorous counterattacks until the enemy is annihilated at sea, on the beaches or on land. The Army will give top priority to the defense of the Shanghai sector. It will concentrate its strength against enemy attempts to land on the south bank of the Yangtze River irrespective of whether the enemy commits his main body or elements. Tactical plans for the Shanghai sector will be drawn up with a view to launching thorough and resolute offensive operations to smash the enemy at the water's edge and take advantage of landing operations.

An outline of the operational plans for each area was as follows:

If the enemy's main force sails up the Yangtze River and lands on the bank northwest of Shanghai, the Army, in accordance with previously determined plans, will order its main force to seize the initiative and, before the enemy landings are completed, to launch resolute and continuous day and night attacks to destroy the enemy at the water's edge. Particular emphasis will be placed on such tactics as the launching of surprise land and water-berne raids, night attacks and concentrated close-range fire. Effective use will be made of the fortified positions 18 which will be used as a springboard from which to launch the offensive. Operational plans for other areas will be determined as the occasion demands. If the situation demands, strength will be transferred to the main area and committed to the decisive battle.

Operational plans will be drawn up for those units stationed in the Chitung sector, as well as those on the north shore of Hangchou Bay, so that they may act in conformity with the strategical situation in the main area of the decisive battle.

Even if the war situation develops unfavorably and becomes critical, the city of Shanghai, as well as the line connecting Suchou and Changshu must be firmly held to facilitate subsequent operations. Strong defensive positions, therefore, will be prepared along the strategic line between Wuhsi and Chiangyin and around Nanching.

If the enemy's main force lands on the north shore of Hangchou Bay, the 13th Army, with the forces available in the area, will exert its maximum effort to resist the enemy. Should the enemy break through, the Chinshan- Pingwangchen- Wuhsing line will be held. In the initial phase, the main body of the 13th Army will remain in position on the banks of the Yangtze River. Should the enemy land even elements of his force in the Yangtze area, prearranged plans will be followed and, regardless of the situation on the north shore of Hangchou Bay, a resolute attack will be launched. When these enemy forces have been destroyed, the enemy's main force will be engaged. Strongly fortified positions, therefore, will be prepared along both banks of the Suchou Ho, north of Chinshan.

^{18.} Positions were to be constructed 10 km in depth from the river bank. In addition, positions were to be constructed at an oblique angle to these forward positions with strong reserve entrenchments to the rear.

Should it be definitely established that the enemy will not land on either bank of the Yangtze River, the main body of the 13th Army will engage in decisive combat with the enemy's main force on the north shore of Hangchou Bay. The trend of operational plans for this engagement will depend upon the situation at the time.


Operational Plans for other fronts:

Forces available in the area will be used to the utmost to interdict the movement of enemy forces landing near Ningpo. Should it become apparent that the enemy plans to establish a base near Ningpo from which to launch operations against the triangular zone, necessary reinforcements will be sent to the area and maximum effort will be exerted to prevent this. Every effort will be made to prevent the Chinese forces from coordinating actions with the United States forces. Should enemy pressure prove overwhelming, Japanese forces may evacuate the south shore of Hangchou Bay but every effort will be made to secure Hangchou itself. To achieve this, strong fortifications will be constructed in and around Hangchou.

Maximum effort will be exerted by forces in the Chitung sector to interdict the advance of enemy forces landing in that area. Chiangtu and its vicinity should be secured at any cost in order to facilitate the over-all progress of the Army.

If the enemy bypasses the Chitung sector and lands on the south bank of the Yangtze River, full advantage will be taken of the favorable strategic situation and the units in the Chitung sector will coordinate their movements with the Army's main effort.

The units stationed in and around Lienyun will make every effort to halt the advance of enemy forces landing in that area. Should they fail to prevent the advance, Tungshan must be secured in order to frustrate the enemy's attempt



to sever central China from north China. Should the enemy land its main force in the Lienyun sector, the necessary forces may be diverted from Tungshan. Solid fortifications will be constructed in and around Tungshan.

Minor elements will be assigned the mission of coping with Chinese guerrillas coordinating their actions with the operations of the United States forces. These elements will maintain the security of the rear during decisive battles with the United States forces. For this purpose, strong fortifications will be constructed at strategic points in the sector adjacent to the enemy. At the same time, thorough measures will be enforced to insure the security of towns, air bases, railroads, waterways etc. in the area. Prior to the landing of United States forces, a strong blow will be dealt the Chinese 3d War Sector Army in order to prevent it from coordinating its actions with those of the United States forces.

Adequate steps will be taken to prevent treachery by troops of the Nanching Nationalist Government and countermeasures will be planned to cope with such an eventuality.

Disposition of Units:

The disposition of units and areas to be fortified during operational preparations are shown on Map 33.

Each group will step up operational preparations while maintaining surveillance of the enemy at its front.

In the event of an enemy attack, during the initial phase of the fighting the units under attack will independently engage the enemy in their zones of operations. The Army will make an overall estimate of the situation and will direct combat operations in accordance with prearranged plans.

Sector northwest of Shanghai: The commander of the 13th Army will personally direct operations in this sector. Irrespective of whether the enemy lands its main force or elements in this sector, in the initial phase the 13th Army will commit its entire strength in the triangular zone with the exception of the organic units of the 6th Army. In the meantime, elements of the 61st and 161st Divisions together with the Shanghai Defense Unit will be responsible for the defense of Shanghai. If the over-all situation permits, maximum strength from all other areas will be diverted to the Shanghai sector. These forces, together with reinforcements from the China Expeditionary Army, will be used to the best advantage in defending the area in depth. The time for opening the attack will be determined by the manner and time of the enemy's landing. Offensive preparations, however, will be completed at the latest by the evening of D Day plus 1.

Should the enemy land on the south shore of Hangchou Bay, the 6th Army will cope with the situation and cover the rear and flanks of the 13th Army during combat.

In the event the situation proves unfavorable and the Japanese forces are compelled to withdraw to Shanghai city and to the Suchou-Changshu line, thus splitting the front in two, the 6th Army commander will command the fighting in the vicinity of Shanghai and the 13th Army commander will personally command the fighting in the Suchou-Changshu sector. To this end, a well fortified command post will be prepared south of Suchou.

Sector on the north shore of Hangchou Bay: The 6th Army commander will direct operations during the initial phase of this engagement. Available forces will exert maximum effort to prevent the enemy from exploiting gains, thereby facilitating the over-all direction of operations of the 13th Army. If the enemy landing on the south bank of the Yangtze River is destroyed or if it is definitely established that

the enemy will not land in this area, the 13th Army commander will commit the main force of the army stationed in and around Shanghai in a decisive battle on the 6th Army front. The disposition of units and the assignment of command responsibility for the engagement will be determined according to the prevailing situation.

In order to destroy the Chinese 3d War Sector Army before United States forces land, elements will be withdrawn from each unit stationed in the vicinity of Shanghai and temporarily attached to the 6th Army as reinforcements.19

43d Army's Defense Plan Against United States Forces (Map 34)

Operational Policy:

In the event of an enemy invasion in Shantung Province, the 43d Army will harass the enemy attempting to establish air and naval bases and, by guerrilla tactics, will inflict heavy casualties on the enemy.

Operational Procedure:

First Phase:

The Navy Surface Special Attack Unit will attack the enemy before it lands. The 43d Army will keep in close contact with the China Expeditionary Army headquarters and, in order to obtain the best results, will cooperate with the air unit.

When the enemy lands, each group in the coastal area will resist strongly from fortified positions and from the bases established for the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Special emphasis

^{19.} This plan was reconstructed from notes written from memory in June 1947 by former Lt Col Noboru Ito, previously a staff officer in charge of operations, 13th Army.

will be placed on dealing the enemy a heavy blow in the initial phase of the operation.

Units near the coast will adopt guerrilla tactics in harassing the enemy's attempt to establish air and sea bases.

Should the enemy land in the Penglai area (northeastern part of Shantung Peninsula) part of the 12th Independent Garrison Unit will oppose it.

If the situation requires, an element or the main strength of the 1st Independent Infantry Brigade will be employed in the Tsingtao area.

The Army will establish an intelligence center near Kaomi.

Army Headquarters will be located at Licheng.


Second Phase:

Utilizing the same operational areas for their bases, the units on the coast will wage guerrilla warfare on a large scale to prevent the enemy from advancing into the interior. The chief tactics to be employed are to cause confusion by disturbing and cutting enemy lines of communication, setting fire to supply dumps and harassing the enemy attempting to construct airfields.

Part of the 9th Independent Garrison Unit will take advantage of the gullies near Itu to delay the enemy's advance.

The 47th Division and the main strength of the 9th Independent Garrison Unit will be dispatched to the fortifications near Licheng in order to help accelerate preparations for defense of that area.

If the situation demands, an element or the main body of the 11th Independent Garrison Unit will be sent to the vicinity of Licheng.



If the enemy lands on the northern part of Shantung Peninsula, elements of the air and ground forces at Pohai Bay will conduct reconnaissance while the main body of the Army near Licheng will execute its planned operation, regardless of the enemy landing.

Third Phase:

By guerrilla attacks, elements of the 47th Division and the 9th Independent Garrison Unit will divert the advancing enemy to the direction of the fortifications near Licheng.

In order to assist the China Expeditionary Army and the reinforced group from the North China Area Army, the main force of the 43d Army will strongly resist the enemy and hold the positions near Licheng.

Even if the main force of the 43d Army is isolated, it will fight to the last to hold the positions around Licheng.

Should there be any large gap between the enemy's forward and rear lines, the main strength of the 43d Army will make short lightning strikes against the enemy outside their positions.

Miscellaneous:

Measures will be taken to maintain constant communication with the 5th Air Army, the 13th Army and the forces at Tungshan and Tienching.

Prior to the opening of this operation, the Naval Special Base Force in Tsingtao will be placed under the 43d Army's command. Details will be issued at a later date.

Communist and native bandit movements and uprisings will be suppressed whenever they occur. If enemy paratroops land, they will be destroyed immediately. Even if they cannot be destroyed, the Army will not evacuate the area to be secured.

Should the main strength of the enemy land in the Lienyun area, part of the 1st Independent Infantry Brigade, in concert with a unit from the 13th army, will be dispatched to the area to delay the enemy's advance inland.

Should the enemy land in the Tienching-Taku sector, part of the 9th Independent Garrison Unit will be sent to Tienching.²⁰

About one-half of the fortifications planned by the 43d Army were completed in the coastal area and, one-third near Changtien while those near Licheng had just been started when the war ended.

Mongolia Garrison Army's Operational Preparations Against the Soviet Forces (Map 34)

In the summer of 1945, in order to strengthen the operational preparations on the north front of the Mongolia Garrison Army, Imperial General Headquarters planned to secure the area south of the line connecting Abagapeitzufu, West Sunit and Pailingmiao with two divisions. However, as many troops were transferred to the Southern, 12th and 13th Armies' areas, only one independent mixed brigade and one independent garrison unit remained to defend the Mongolia Garrison Army's area. Fortifications constructed by these two units had been completed in the area north of Wanchuan and in the vicinity of Tatung and Fengchen when the Soviet Union entered the war.

^{20.} After the war officers of the 43d Army reconstructed this plan from memory.

On 9 August, when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, the China Expeditionary Army ordered the 118th Division of the 13th Army to be placed under the command of the Mongolia Garrison Army. The war ended, however, before the division arrived in the area.

13th Air Division's Defense Plan Against United States Forces

The following is an outline of the 13th Air Division's plan against the enemy invading from the sea:

Policy:

The Air Division will employ its entire strength to destroy at sea enemy convoys attempting to land on north or central China. Should these convoys succeed in landing, the Air Division will cooperate directly with local land units. It is estimated that the main enemy force will land in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Emphasis on operational preparations, therefore, will be laid on the triangular area.

Outline of Operations:

The Air Division will maintain close liaison with the Navy and the armies concerned. It will obtain and evaluate accurately all information that will be of assistance in detecting proposed enemy landings. Whenever necessary, the sea will be patrolled in the direction of Okinawa in order to locate enemy task forces and transport convoys.

In order to avoid plane losses, immediately it is known an enemy air raid is imminent, the majority of the planes of the Air Division will be taken to a safe place in the rear.

Should the enemy land to the north of Ningpo, the entire Air Division will attack them. Should the enemy land to the south of Yungchia, only a small element of the Division will be employed against them.

Should the enemy invade south China, elements of the Air Division will cooperate directly with the operations of the 23d Army.

The target of attack will be the leading echelon of the enemy transport convoy. Special attack units will be trained to attack enemy aircraft carriers.

In order to expedite the operations, units will be directed to act in accordance with previously arranged plans of attack.

Based on the above, a detailed combat plan will be drawn up to cope with any and all possible enemy moves.

As a result of an agreement reached between the 13th Air Division and the 5th Air Army, the former became responsible for air operations in central and south China and the latter for those in north China.²¹

Withdrawal from Southwest China

Withdrawal of Sixth Area Army

In order to be prepared for a decisive battle against the United States forces, the Sixth Area Army planned to withdraw its troops from Kwangsi and Hunan Provinces and to concentrate its entire strength in the Wuchang-Hankou sector. The Sixth Area Army's operational plan

^{21.} Monograph No. 76, Air Operations in the China Area, 1939-1945.

read as follows:

While withdrawing along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway to the Wuchang-Hankou sector, the main strength of the 11th Army will threaten the rear flank of the Chinese confronting the 20th Army.

As the troops withdraw along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway, the 20th Army will establish fortifications at key points in its area of operations, especially on its western and southern fronts. Later, in cooperation with the 11th Army, the 20th Army will assemble its troops in the Wuchang-Hankou sector.

The 34th Army will hold vital areas around the Wuchang-Hankou sector where it will strengthen its fortifications and accumulate war materials.

By March 1946, the entire strength of the Sixth Area Army will have completed preparations for the defense of the Wuchang-Hankou sector against a general counteroffensive by the enemy.

In accordance with this plan, the 11th and 20th Armies began their withdrawal and the 34th Army accelerated the strengthening of the lines of communication in the Wuchang-Hankou area. At this time, the situation in the north became critical and the 34th Army Headquarters was ordered to north Korea. About mid-June 1945, the 34th Army Headquarters left the Wuchang-Hankou sector and the Sixth Area Army assumed the responsibility for operations in this sector.

The 3d, 13th and 34th Divisions from the 11th Army as well as the 27th, 40th and 131st Divisions of the 23d Army were temporarily placed all under the tactical command of the 20th Army commander during the withdrawal operation. In mid-July these divisions left a

line running east and west through Hengyang for Nanchang and Hsiaochihkou and, by early August, the leading columns had reached the vicinity of these towns.

Withdrawal of the 11th Army

Although about the middle of April the 11th Army was directed to send the 3d, 13th and 34th Divisions to the lower Yangtze River area and place them under the direct command of the China Expeditionary Army, from 17 April until 3 May the 3d and 13th Divisions were engaged in a pincer attack from the north and south against the Chinese 46th Army around Tuan. In addition, under orders from the Sixth Area Army, the main body of the 34th Division was fighting in an effort to alleviate the hopeless situation around Chihkiang. Consequently, the withdrawal of these divisions could not begin immediately.

In the latter part of May the 3d and 13th Divisions started to evacuate the front lines. The 3d Division encountered the enemy near Chienchang and the 13th Division was intercepted near Ishan but both divisions beat back the enemy and continued to withdraw to the east.

About 20 May, the Chinese 46th and 91st Armies attacked the 11th Army near Liuchowhsien but were repulsed. Later, the 11th Army was engaged by the Chinese 3d Area Army along the Lingchwan-Kweilin line and again near Chuanhsien by the Chinese 20th and 26th Armies. In both cases the 11th Army crushed the enemy, although near Chuanhsien

the entire strength of the 11th Army had to be thrown against the Chinese forces.

The withdrawal thereafter met with little resistance from the enemy and, at the war's end in mid-August, the greater part of the llth Army had completed its withdrawal.

Withdrawal of the 23d Army

The 23d Army ordered the 27th, 40th and 131st Divisions to transfer their forces to the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. The 27th and 40th Divisions, therefore, marched to Nanchang, through the Nankang-Tayu-Nanhsiung area, mopping up the enemy along their routes, while the 131st Division advanced to the Wuchang-Hankou sector along the Canton-Hankou railway. These divisions began to move during the latter part of June and by mid-August had reached Nanchang, Hsiaochih-kou and Changlochieh. Part of the 23d Independent Mixed Brigade remained to garrison Luichow Peninsula while the main body of the Brigade moved overland to Canton. At the time of the surrender, because of the geographical importance of Swatow, the Swatow Detachment was still there.

Withdrawal of the 20th Army


At the conclusion of the Chihkiang Operation, the 47th Division, was placed under the command of the 43d Army stationed at Licheng, and ordered to proceed to Yencheng, via the Peiping-Hankou railway, while

the 34th Division was ordered to advance to the lower reaches of the Yangtze River by way of Wuning.

At the war's end, these two divisions were in the vicinity of Chouchiakow and Wuning respectively. The remaining strength of the 20th Army was disposed as shown on Map 36.

Operations Against Soviet Forces

The U.S.S.R. declared war against Japan and on the night of 8-9 August commenced military movements. Imperial General Headquarters directed the Kwantung Army to smash the enemy invasion with those forces posted along the border area and to immediately prepare its entire force for a defensive operation against Russia on every front. At the same time, it ordered the China Expeditionary Army to prepare personnel and munitions for immediate transfer to south Manchuria and, in the meantime, to strike at the Russian invasion with the forces on the spot. The area west of and including the line between Shanhaikuan, Tachengtzu, to the east edge of Dalai Nor to Yugutszeryyu Khid was placed under the jurisdiction of the China Expeditionary Army and all Kwantung Army units within this new operational area were placed under the command of the commander of the China Expeditionary Army. Accordingly, the Jehol Detachment, composed of six infantry battalions and stationed in Jehol Province, came under the command of the China Expeditionary Army. The China Expeditionary Army dispatched the Sixth Army Headquarters together with six divisions and



six independent mixed brigades to Manchuria where, in accordance with Imperial General Headquarters' orders, they were placed under the command of the Kwantung Army. It also furnished the Kwantung Army with necessary war materials. Further, it transferred the 118th Division from the 13th Army to the Mongolia Garrison Army.²² (On 15 August, part of the division reached the area to the south of Wanchuan.)

On 9 August, the Mongolia Army ordered the 2d Independent Mixed Brigade and the 4th Independent Carrison Unit to stop the enemy in front of their fortified lines around Changpei. The main strength of the 2d Independent Mixed Brigade (four infantry battalions, one antitank gun company, two field artillery batteries and one engineer company) occupied prepared positions near Changpei and the Outer Great Wall line. Two infantry battalions and one artillery battery of the Brigade guarded the railway line between Pataling and Wanchuan. (Map 35)

On 9 August, Russian troops invaded Inner Mongolia and were reported passing through Erdeni Somon. This force was not seen again but an unconfirmed report states that on 13 August a Japanese plane bombed mechanized enemy units near Yehchiatsun, 12 km north northwest of Changpei. On the 14th, the Changpei Garrison Company took part in a minor engagement with a mechanized unit of unknown strength outside

^{22.} Prior to June 1945, the 118th Division had been under the command of the Mongolia Garrison Army.

the town of Changpei and, on the same day, returned to its base.

Notified of the cessation of hostilities, the Brigade abandoned fighting to cover the evacuation of Japanese civilians and officials from Wanchuan.


On the night of the 18th, the enemy opened an attack against
Japanese fortified positions at Wanchuan. Acting in accordance with
Army orders, on the 19th, the Brigade sent out a flag of truce but
the bearer was met with a concentration of fire. Representatives of
the 3d and 5th truce missions were retained by the Russians and appeals for a two days! truce were refused. On the afternoon of the
20th, Russian troops charged into the Japanese lines but, on the following day, were repulsed.

By noon on the 21st, Japanese nationals had been evacuated from Wanchuan and, on the evening of the same day, the entire Brigade e-vacuated their positions. On 26 August, the Brigade reached Nankou without enemy interference.

Japanese losses during this operation were 60 killed, 50 wounded and 7 missing.²³

Disposition of the forces of the China Expeditionary Army at the cessation of hostilities were as shown on Map 36.

^{23.} The above operation was reconstructed from records kept by Maj Shintaro Tsujita, a staff officer of the 2d Independent Mixed Brigade.



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